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Article

Buying Our Way Out of Corruption:
Performance-Based Incentive Bonuses for
Developing Country Politicians and
Bureaucrats

Martin Skladany t
This Article argues for the establishment of performance-basedfinancial
incentive programs in developing countries that would pay politicians
and high-level bureaucrats substantial bonuses (ten to twenty times or
more of their official yearly salaries) to reduce corruption within their
countries. These incentive programs would turn the weapon of greed back
on itself by aligning the motivations of politicians and bureaucratswith
the stated goals of government and the desires and will of citizens.
Paying corrupt public officials to stop stealing may seem distasteful, but
the problems that developing countries face and yet cannot overcome
because of systemic corruption are staggering and have been largely
resistant to other anticorruptionstrategies. By simply altering the source
of funds to public servants, performance-based incentive programs for
developing country politicians and high-level bureaucrats can, over the
long run, create a culture of clean governance conducive to sustained
economic growth and can make all aspects of development, such as
improving infrastructure,education, and health care, more manageable.

t J.D. Yale Law School, M.P.A. Princeton University, M.Phil. Cambridge University. I
would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Mary Boniece, Jan Ginter Deutsch, John Donohue,
Owen Fiss, Henry Hansmann, Caroline Sherman, and James Whitman for their assistance and
suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION

The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership
....The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders
to rise to the responsibility,to the challenge of personal example which are
the hallmarks of true leadership.'
While Prime Minister of India in the 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi publicly
stated that he believed 85% of government spending on development
within India never reached its intended beneficiaries but was instead lost
to corruption 2 at every stage along the way. 3 A 2004 survey in Chad
showed that 99% of money earmarked for rural health clinics by the
Ministry of Finance never reached its destination. 4 In Uganda, a relatively
functional African country, "less than 30 percent of the funds dedicated to
primary education was actually reaching schools" in 1998.5 A poll by
Gallup International Associations of 50,000 individuals worldwide
revealed that "Africans ... are painfully aware of the inadequacy of their
leaders: 8 out of 10 said 'political leaders are dishonest'; three-quarters
'deemed them to have too much power and responsibility'; while 7 out of
6
10 'think politicians behave unethically."'
As Heineman and Heimann observe, "Although it is difficult to
quantify global corruption, there is little question that huge problems exist.
For example, the World Bank estimated in 2004 that public officials
worldwide receive more than $1 trillion in bribes each year (and that figure
does not include embezzlement)." 7 The above sum is staggering and
directly harms the poor, but the larger tragedy is that systemic corruption
can destroy most incentives to create wealth and can perpetuate a dynamic
in which it is "in most people's interest to take action that directly or
8
indirectly damages everyone else" :
The rot starts with government but it afflicts the entire society.
1. CHINUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA 1 (1983).

2. 1will use the term "corruption" to refer to a politician or bureaucrat's misuse of public
office for private gain, including illegal campaign finance.
3. Amelia Gentleman, India's War on Poverty: Easy Victory Unlikely, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 28, 2006, at 2, availableat http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/27/news/poor.php.
4. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOUTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 66 (2007). Collier points out: "The survey had the extremely
modest purpose of finding out how much of the money actually reached the clinics - not
whether the clinics spent it well, or whether the staff of the clinics knew what they were
doing, just where the money went." Id.
5. "Not all of the missing money was stolen or wasted; some lolf it was re-appropriated to
other priorities by middle-level officials." ROBERT CALDERIsI, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA: WHY
FOREIGN AID ISN'T WORKING 163 (2006).

6. Lydia Polgreen, Why So Starry-Eyed? Misery Loves Optimism in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2006, at D1.
7. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85 FOREIGN
AFF., May-June 2006, at 76.

8. TIM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST: EXPOSING WHY THE RICH ARE RICH, THE
POOR ARE POOR - AND WHY YOU CAN NEVER BUY A DECENT USED CAR! 198 (2006).

YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.

[Vol. 12

There's no point investing in a business because the government
will not protect you against thieves. (So, you might as well become
a thief.) There's no point in paying your phone bill because
nobody can successfully take you to court (so there's no point
being a phone company). There's no point getting an education
because jobs are not handed out on merit (and in any case, you
can't borrow money for school fees because the bank cannot collect
on the loan, and the government doesn't provide good schools).
There's no point setting up an import business because the
customs officers will be the ones to benefit (and so there is little
trade, and so the customs office is underfunded and looks even
harder for bribes). 9
From an economic perspective, systemic corruption reduces the
beneficial effects of competition in the market, the quality of goods
produced, ° foreign direct investment (FD),11 government revenue, 12 and
bank supervision, 13 while raising the prices that the poor pay for goods,
increasing the risk premium that developing countries (LDCs) 14 pay when
issuing bonds,1 5 and swelling the informal economy. 16 From a political
perspective, systemic corruption corrodes the legal system, turns the
bureaucracy into a self-seeking entity that disregards the public interest,
undermines representational democracy, reduces educational funding,17
and increases military spending and arms procurement. 18 From a societal
9. Id. at 198-99.
10. For example, "in Southern Chad, farmers grow their cassava far away from the road
and do not fertilize their crops, worried that their plants will grow too high and be visible to
military vehicles driving by." CALDERISI, supra note 5, at 60.
11. See generally Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Corruption on InternationalInvestors?, 82 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000).
12. See generally Eric Friedman et al., Dodging the Grabbing Hand: the Determinants of
Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 459 (2000) (controlling for income per head).
13. Shang-Jin Wei & Sara E. Sievers, The Cost of Crony Capitalism, in THE ASIA
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1999 at 50, 52 (World Economic Forum, Geneva).
14. 1 will use the terms "developing countries" and "LDCs" interchangeably. Numerous
scholars prefer to distinguish between least developed countries and developing countries,
reserving the abbreviation "LDC" for the former. I will use the term "LDC" to designate both.
This is obviously a large spectrum of states, and the poorest states are inevitably in greater
need of performance-based financial incentive programs. I do not use the term "LDC"
broadly out of disrespect towards any developing countries; rather, I use it as an umbrella
simply for convenience's sake, since performance-based incentive programs are needed in
many least developed countries and developing countries. Also, I will use the terms "public
officials" and "public servants" interchangeably with "politicians and high-level bureaucrats"
and "politicians and bureaucrats."
15. See generally Francisco Ciocchini et al., Does Corruption Increase Emerging Market Bond
Spreads?, 55 J. ECON. & Bus. 503 (2003).
16. See generally Simon Johnson et al., Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 387 (1998).
17. See generally Paolo Mauro, Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, 69
J. PUB. ECON.263 (1998).
18. See generally Sanjeev Gupta et al., Corruption and Military Spending, 17 EUR. J. POL.
ECON. 749 (2001).
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perspective, systemic corruption breeds cynicism, rage, despair, and
factionalism, exacerbates the emigration of skilled citizens, and promotes
individual advancement above ethical concerns. From an environmental
perspective, systemic corruption increases pollution. 19 From a foreign aid
perspective, systematic pilfering by developing country public officials
blocks potentially life-saving assistance from reaching the poor and
ultimately discourages foreign generosity, for developed countries (DCs)
may become reluctant to contribute aid where the greater portion is stolen
and never reaches those in need.
The problems that LDCs face but cannot overcome because of systemic
corruption are staggering. Systemic corruption can be a matter of life or
death for millions of LDC citizens. There are over 9.5 million deaths
annually of children under the age of five in developing countries, twothirds of which are "entirely preventable" 20 but extremely difficult to
prevent because "fragile states, characterized by weak institutions with
high levels of corruption, political instability and a shaky rule of law, are
often incapable of providing basic services to their citizens." 21 Frustration
and anger regarding systemic corruption have even resulted in dramatic
outbreaks of violence. In Peru, for example, corrupt public officials were
lynched by disillusioned citizens. 22
Theft by government officials has been largely resistant to
anticorruption strategies. Unfortunately, "[t]he energy invested in the anticorruption drive has failed to reduce average levels of graft in government
or business in the world's poorest regions, according to World Bank
officials and other leading analysts." 23 Given the pervasiveness of
corruption and the drastic nature of the problems that result, new policies
that properly take into account LDC environments are desperately
needed.24
For the poorest of poor countries, dramatically reducing corruption 2 is
19. See generally Heinz Welsch, Corruption, Growth, and the Environment: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 9 ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 663 (2004).
20. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 2008: CHILD SURVIVAL 6, 15 (2008),
availableat http://www.unicef.org/sowc08.
21. Id. at 20.
22. See Larry Rohter & Juan Forero, Unending Graft Is Threatening Latin America, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al.
23. Donald Greenlees, Stagnation Marks Anti-Corruption Fight, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 6,
2006, at 1. "Kathleen Moktan, the Manila-based director of the Asian Development Bank's
capacity development and governance division, said she would 'never argue' that corruption
had been reduced. .... 'There has been no global improvement on average,' Daniel Kaufman,
the director of global programs at the World Bank Institute in Washington, said by phone. 'It
is quite sobering. The average quality of governance worldwide has remained stagnant.'" Id.
24. One such small, yet innovative example, outside the field of anticorruption efforts, of
taking LDC environments into account is the fact that road signs in Zambia are "deliberately
perforated, for otherwise they would soon be removed and turned into pots and pans." John
Grimond, Return to Lundazi, EcONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 63, 64.
25. Throughout this Article, for the sake of convenience, I will talk of the need to reduce
corruption, when in fact what LDCs are truly seeking is to reduce the total economic, political,
and social cost of corruption. Further, while dramatically reducing corruption (i.e., the
economic, political, and social cost of corruption) is of vital importance to many LDCs,
completely eliminating corruption is an unrealistic goal given diminishing returns to scale
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the most significant step that a developing country can take toward
successful, sustained development. 26 As Cooper notes, "Imagine a poor
country with a well-run legal system but not much else in the way of
resources. Someone will somehow find an opportunity to make money. In
the end, the country will probably grow rich." 27 This is not to claim that
low corruption within a state guarantees sustained development. 28 Many
and historical precedent.
26. Since the end of World War II, the development field has gone through numerous
paradigms that have all offered different explanations as to why LDCs are poor and different
policy prescriptions as to how LDCs could lift themselves out of poverty or be lifted out of
poverty by others. As time has passed, more and more models of development have sprung
forth, including: Post-Development Model (see, e.g., THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid
Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997)), Washington Consensus Model (see, e.g., essentially
any economic report by the World Bank in the 1980s or 1990s before the seminal WORLD
BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993)), Asian Tigers

Model (see, e.g., Ha-Joon Chang, The East Asian Development Experience, in RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003)), Capabilities Model (see, e.g., AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999)), Democracy and/or Rule of Law Model (see, e.g.,
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)), and a

plethora of other, partial explanations as to why LDCs are poor (see, e.g., JARED DIAMOND,
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1997)). 1 take corruption and poor
governance to be the predominant factors restraining LDCs from a fighting chance at securing
the fruits of development. For a contrarian view that asserts that the causal pathway should
be reversed - i.e., that LDCs are corrupt and poorly governed because they are poor, not that
corruption and poor governance lead to countries being poor - see JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE
END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005).

Andrew Rice responds to

Sachs, stating:
According to a 2002 study conducted by the African Union, corruption
consumes more than a quarter of the continent's gross domestic product
every year, about $148 billion. Faced with such facts, Sachs tries to
recalculate reality. He publishes a chart of corruption figures that have
been "controlled statistically for income levels" and concludes that Africa
is not "distinctly poorly governed by the standardsof very poor countries."
This is a little like saying if you control for height, the Ivy League is the
best conference in college basketball. The generals who looted Nigeria a government of "average" honesty by Sachs's measure - were not
stealing relative dollars: Check their Swiss bank statements.
Andrew Rice, Why Is Africa Still Poor?, NATION, Oct. 24, 2005, at 38, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051024/rice.
Yet one comment by Sachs could be
interpreted as possible sympathy for incentive programs for LDC public officials that target
corruption. He states:
[Wihere authoritarian or corrupt regimes hold sway, the consequences for
the population are likely to be tragic, but the responsibilities of the rich
world are also limited. Perhaps the most important action that rich
countries can take in those circumstances is to help the well-governed
neighbors of such countries to prove that there is help available for those
that are organized politically to help themselves.
SACHS, supra, at 269. Finally, for a summary of the empirical literature on the connection
between corruption and economic growth, see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2002).

27. Robert Cooper, The Mystery of Development, PROSPEcT MAG., Feb. 2006, at 34.
28. See Megan McArdle, The Virtue of Riches: How Wealth Makes Us More Moral, REASON,
July 2006, at 55, available at http://reason.com/news/show/36749.html (reviewing BENJAMIN
M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005)).

"[In a recent

Foreign Policy essay, Mois~s Naim quotes Franqois Bourguignon, the [World Bank]'s chief
economist, as saying '[wle do have a good sense of what are the main obstacles to growth and
what are the conditions without which an economy can't grow. But we are far less sure about
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other factors, including education levels, the capacity of health care
systems, and intelligent economic policy, play important roles. But these
other factors become more manageable when a poor country has clean
governance - e.g., most medicines actually reach those who need them;
teachers show up to teach and do not steal and resell school materials; and
politicians do not pursue economic policies whose sole purpose is to hide
29
corrupt transactions.
For low middle-income countries, substantial reductions in corruption
can end the existence of extreme poverty within their borders. Low
middle-income countries have little money to help lift the extreme poor
within their borders out of poverty, and corruption can worsen the
problem by preventing a significant amount of the money allocated for
such projects from reaching the extreme poor. Large reductions in
corruption would thus enable more money to be on hand for those in need.
Corruption also imposes costs on those public officials who choose to
30
partake in it.
It is time-consuming and risky to solicit bribes and siphon
off government funds. Plus, it wins no respect from citizens or from the
international community.
Corruption leads to precarious, unstable
positions because public officials cannot rely on their ability and merit to
maintain steady employment but instead must satisfy the whims and
pleasures of those who are more powerful. 31 By stunting development,
politicians and bureaucrats deprive themselves as well as their fellow
citizens of clean air, safe streets, health, and longevity.
Given how devastating the effects of corruption are on most LDCs, this
Article proposes providing financial incentives (legal bribes or
inducements) to government officials in developing countries to stop them
from partaking in corruption - from robbing the LDC's treasury, stealing
overseas development aid, or soliciting bribes from private citizens,
what are the other ingredients needed to create and sustain growth."' Id. Conversely, LDCs
that are extremely corrupt can still experience large economic growth. Even in those happy
moments when economists have a pretty good idea of what should be done, they are
generally at a loss to prescribe programs that can survive a political process that is usually
controlled by the same group of people who are causing the problems. Yet it would be a
mistake to assume that such LDCs do not need a performance-based incentive program
targeted at their senior public servants because such growth may not be high enough and/or
sustainable over the long term. Even if this were not the case, the existence of significant
corruption in these countries would still signify scores of resources that were not getting to
the poor. Further, as mentioned before, corruption would still be undermining noneconomic
strides toward justice by corroding the fairness of the legal system and elections, harming the
environment, breeding cynicism, etc.
29. See Cooper, supra note 27. "Many development programmes concentrate on
infrastructure, social programmes, health or education. It is desirable to improve all of these
areas in developing countries, but good infrastructure and healthcare are as much the result of
development as a cause. For these benefits to be lasting, they must be provided by a wellfunctioning state, paid for by a well-functioning tax system and operated by honest state
employees .... Spending money on public services as a way of promoting development is
like trying to cure an illness by hiding the symptoms. It may do good - and it may be all that
can be done - but it does not go to the heart of the problem." [d.

30. 1do not mean to imply that all public officials in developing countries are corrupt.
31. While this holds true for competent and incompetent public officials, it should be

noted that incompetent public officials could conceivably be better served by a corrupt public
administration.
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corporations, or other public servants. 32 Performance-based financial
incentive programs in developing countries, established by a coalition of
DC governments, intergovernmental organizations, or others, would pay
LDC politicians and high-level bureaucrats substantial bonuses - ten to
twenty times or more of their official yearly salaries - to reduce
corruption within their countries. 33 The incentive program would better
align the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats with the stated goals of
government and the desires and will of citizens. 34 There would be no
doubt that the incentive bonuses would be meant to financially substitute
for the money that corrupt public servants traditionally steal from the
government or take from citizens. In essence, performance-based incentive
programs would aim to turn the weapon of greed back on itself by
exploiting it as a means of positive change. By simply altering the source
of funds to public servants, performance-based incentive programs for
LDC politicians and bureaucrats can, over the long run, create a culture of
clean governance conducive to sustained economic growth and can make
all aspects of development, such as improving infrastructure, education,
35
and health care, more manageable.
If public servants reduce their corruption enough to qualify for
incentive bonuses, the payment of these bonuses would have a
transformative effect on the LDC. 36 Citizens would no longer have to
32. There are at least three ways to effect change in others: convince them, scare them, or
bribe them. One can convince others by getting them to see and believe in the logical, moral,
or religious superiority of a viewpoint. A government or a clandestine organization like a
gang can scare others by credibly threatening fines, humiliation, imprisonment, torture, or
death. Finally, one can "bribe" others by offering illegal (kickbacks or bribes) or legal
(incentives) inducements to perform or abstain from performing certain activities. This
Article focuses on the latter option.
33. 1 will use the terms "performance-based financial incentive bonuses," "performancebased incentive bonuses," "incentive bonuses," "incentives," and "bonuses" interchangeably
throughout this Article. Also, I will often truncate "performance-based financial incentive
programs" to "incentive programs." While nonfinancial incentive bonuses could theoretically
be used, in this Article I will examine only performance-based financial incentives.
34. For this reason, performance-based financial incentive programs are far superior to
merely raising public officials' salaries. Empirical studies that investigate the link between
corruption levels and simply raising public officials' salaries show that the latter provides
poor or largely insignificant results. Any significant results can suffer from endogeneity:
while high wages may reduce corruption, corrupt politicians may allocate themselves high
wages. See Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption:A Cross-NationalStudy, 76 J. PUB. ECON.
399, 436 (2000). In corrupt societies in which "public positions are often purchased by
borrowing money from family and friends," Huther and Shah note that raising public sector
wages, not through performance-based incentive bonuses but instead through traditional
wage increases, "simply raises the purchase price and subsequent corruption efforts to repay
loans." Jeffrey Huther & Anwar Shah, Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs:A Frameworkfor
Evaluation 7 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2501, 2000). See also Timothy
Besley & John McLaren, Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives, 103 ECON. J. 119, 137
(1993) (Efficiency wages, wages above what a tax inspector, in their example, could earn
elsewhere, "may not be a good idea much of the time, even for relatively high levels of
corruption.").
35. "World Bank researchers and others showed that small cuts in the level of corruption
in a country could multiply its per-capita income by two to three times, reduce infant
mortality, increase economic growth and foreign direct investment." Greenlees, supra note 23.
36. 1assume that public officials are self-interested, rational agents.
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waste their time and money negotiating bribes for services to which they
are entitled; companies would not face the surreptitious and unfair
decision-making process that corruption engenders in contract bids and
privatization sales; previously unprofitable business ventures would
become viable because the cost of the venture would not be artificially
inflated by expected expenditures on bribes; and judges would be much
more apt to administer justice and signal to citizens and businesses that
they could confidently proceed in their activities without the ever present
threat of an arbitrary legal decision being rendered against them.
Unlike most official development assistance (ODA) projects,
performance-based incentive programs for LDC public officials that target
corruption would have a built-in self-enforcing momentum in that the
programs would encourage eligible public officials to monitor corruption
and pressure their peers, subordinates, and, at times, superiors to comply
because incentive bonuses would be paid collectively based on nationwide,
not individual, performance. 37 Under an incentive program, if the
nationwide performance benchmark is met, all eligible public officials will
receive a bonus; if the performance benchmark is not met, no one will
receive a bonus.
Another potential benefit of an incentive program is to give LDC
citizens a platform from which to protest state corruption. The existence of
a performance-based anticorruption program would improve government
responsiveness to citizen complaints, thereby encouraging citizens to
report corrupt practices. 38 This increasing voice could also assume the
form of pressuring LDC politicians and bureaucrats to reduce corruption
and take the incentive bonus money instead of pilfering the treasury or
soliciting bribes from citizens.
Incentive programs for LDC public officials also avoid the main
drawback of traditional ODA: unconditional distribution to LDC public
coffers, which inadvertently propagates corruption by providing a constant
source of funds for public servants to embezzle. Unlike traditional ODA,
incentive bonuses are not opportunities for public officials to be corrupt
but rather motivation for them to reduce corruption. Public officials cannot
steal incentive bonuses; they must earn them. That leads to a further
advantage - if LDC public officials are not sufficiently motivated by the
prospect of incentive bonuses to improve their performance, the incentive
programs will simply not pay out any of the earmarked money and hence
will be much less expensive and less wasteful than other forms of foreign
aid.39 Incentive programs targeting corruption have yet another advantage
37. This aspect of performance-based incentive programs for public officials with
corruption as the performance variable enables them to effectively counter both low-level and
high-level corruption along with corruption associated with different structures of
government institutions and political processes. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Corruption,108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993).
38. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
39. If public servants in an LDC do not qualify for incentive bonuses, the performancebased incentive program would only have to bear the financial cost of collecting the data
associated with the performance measurements and paying the expenses associated with
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- they will not breed a bureaucracy of aid workers that increases the cost
of ODA and recruits away the most talented local LDC individuals from
other enterprises, 40 because only a handful of full-time employees staffing
an independent administrative committee will be needed to manage each
incentive program.
This Article argues that performance-based incentive programs should
be implemented to tackle corruption in LDCs. Given the skeptical reaction
many readers might have to performance-based LDC incentive programs, a
substantial portion of this Article will address possible objections to the
proposal. Part I articulates the contours of a model performance-based
financial incentive program for LDC politicians and high-level bureaucrats,
while making clear that there are dozens of components of incentive
programs that can potentially be tailored to fit the unique circumstances of
different LDCs. Part II sketches the general idea of principal-agent theory
and then examines the literature on performance-based incentives for
public officials. My analysis will show how incentive programs can be
structured for maximal effectiveness, and how traditional opposition to
high-powered performance incentives in the public sector can be overcome
when corruption is used as a performance variable. Part III surveys
possible negative consequences of setting up incentive programs for LDC
public officials and potential sources of opposition to such programs. Part
III also explains how these concerns can be eliminated or reduced so that
they do not pose a serious problem to the successful establishment of
incentive programs. Finally, Part IV concludes that performance-based
incentive programs for LDC public officials are the most promising
prospect for clean governance, and for attaining all of the benefits
identified as flowing from it.

1. THE MODEL

INCENTIVE PROGRAM

This Part describes the most salient features of performance-based
incentive programs for LDC public officials. While one would expect
many of the features described to be integrated into most or all incentive
programs for LDCs, each LDC's incentive program should be tailored, as
appropriate, to the particular situations and needs of that developing
country. Keeping this in mind, this Part presents a model performancebased incentive program, not to pronounce it as the optimal incentive
program for LDCs but to outline the major components or parameters of
maintaining the incentive program's investments. As will be discussed later, it would be
beneficial for incentive program founders to donate enough money initially to the
independent committee running the program to guarantee the availability of sufficient funds
to pay out all future incentive bonuses. If LDC public officials do not take advantage of the
program by reducing corruption, any excess investment returns from this initial large infusion
of cash into the program could be returned to the founders, reducing the cost of the incentive
program to them.
40. See generally GRAHAM HANCOCK, LORDS OF POVERTY: THE POWER, PRESTIGE, AND
CORRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AID BUSINESS (1989).
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such a program without taking firm positions on all its structural details.
A. Performance Measurement
The first component of an incentive program is identifying the
performance variable. The performance variable that should be measured
by incentive programs for LDC public officials is corruption - a
comprehensive and accurate indication of which can be determined by
aggregating
data
from many
different sources
(performance
measurements).
An example of such an aggregated corruption
measurement, which could serve as a solid foundation for any incentive
program's measurement composite, is Transparency International's
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).41 Another possible foundation for an
incentive program's measurement composite is the World Bank's
governance indicators. 42
Like the CPI or World Bank governance
indicators, possible performance measurements could take the form of
reports, surveys, indices, and polls. 4 3 Further, they should include analyses
by thousands of individuals, from foreign and domestic policy experts and
businesspersons to citizens of differing backgrounds.
Using numerous different performance measurements has three
related benefits: (1) it leads to a more accurate assessment of the real level
of corruption within a developing country; (2) it makes it more difficult for
LDC public officials to game performance measurements through bribery
or threats; and (3) it reduces the pressure - from both external and
internal sources - that would naturally gather around a single entity
charged with determining the flow of millions of dollars to a concentrated
41. The CPI 2007 ranks 180 countries and is comprised of fourteen sources from twelve
independent institutions. These institutions include the Asian Development Bank, African
Development Bank, Bertelsmann Foundation, World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit,
Freedom House, Global Insight, IMD International, Merchant International Group, UNECA,
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, and the World Economic Forum. The "goal of the
CPI is to provide data on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries" by rating each
country on a score of zero to ten - the higher the score, the less the perceived corruption.
JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL & UNIVERSITY OF PASSAU, THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2007, at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/23965/358196.
All fourteen sources
"measure the overall extent of corruption. This is not the case if aspects of corruption are
mixed with issues other than corruption, such as political instability or nationalism." Id.
Further, "the CPI 2007 combines assessments from the past two years to reduce abrupt
variations in scoring that might arise due to random effects." Id. at 3.
42. See generally Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, 18 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 253 (2004).
43. While the CPI does a good job of collecting multiple sources on perceived corruption
from domestic and foreign businesspersons and public policy analysts, it does not include
public opinion surveys - all its sources collect data from experts, not from the general public
in the countries being scored. Transparency International has another corruption perception
measuring tool, the Global Corruption Barometer, a public opinion survey of more than
63,199 individuals in sixty countries that gauges the public's experience with and views of
corruption.
Global Corruption Barometer 2007, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/gcb/2007/gcb-2007 faq
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
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group of public officials. 44
One of the great advantages of having the performance variable of
incentive programs be corruption is that, comparatively speaking, it is a
very nonideological and noncontroversial goal - i.e., almost all people
agree that reducing corruption is a good thing. 45 Numerous other public
policy positions are much less clear-cut. For example, some academics still
disagree over the relative merit of numerous macroeconomic policies for
LDCs. While the goal of reducing corruption is much more nonideological
and noncontroversial than almost any other policy, it is still not completely
free from all association with political ideology and economic policy
debates. Certain economic policies make corruption easier to pull off. For
example,
High black market premiums and negative real interest rates
certainly make corruption possible. The leader gets foreign
exchange at the official rate and sells it at the black market rate. He
finances his purchase of foreign exchange using loans at the
negative real interest rate and invests the money in foreign assets
46
with a positive real interest rate.
The same is true for some noneconomic policies and structural features of
bureaucracies. Since this is the case, when incentive programs attempt to
get public officials to be less corrupt, the incentive programs could be
perceived as advocating certain policies that might be more contested than
the value of reducing corruption.
I am not claiming that this occasional association of corruption with
other policies that are more controversial is a bad thing, simply that such
associations should be acknowledged and their extent well understood. In
fact, certain policies and laws will likely be altered if public officials are to
become substantially less corrupt.47 Those LDCs that might disagree with
44. Given how even academics these days occasionally need police protection when
expressing their opinions, one cannot be certain that a few high-ranking politicians and
bureaucrats would not be tempted to threaten select employees of a rating organization if it
were the only organization responsible for rating the level of corruption within developing
countries. Of course, this threat is dramatically reduced if such responsibility is diffused
across thousands of individuals. See The Great Plains Drain: How the Interior is Learning to Live
with a Shrinking Population, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 35 ("In the 1980s two academics from
Rutgers University suggested turning the plains into a 'buffalo commons', where the animals
that grazed the area before white immigration would be encouraged to return. The idea was
so unpopular that its authors occasionally had to be protected by police.").
45. For a nuanced position, see David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption
Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455, 456 (1999).
46. See EASTERLY, supra note 26, at 258. Easterly also states, "A high black market
premium or a highly negative real interest rate practically guarantees massive graft." Id. at
252.
47. Corruption may lead to terribly inefficient economic outcomes. The Institute for
Liberty and Democracy spent 289 days and $1231 (including expenses and lost wages) in 1983
to discover the "cost of legality" when registering a clothing factory in Peru. "At that time...
[$1,2311 was the equivalent of 32 minimum monthly wages." The institute was solicited for
bribes ten times during the registration process. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE
INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD xii (1989).
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some of the policies indirectly associated with reducing corruption do not
have to implement the policies that they disagree with to receive the
incentive bonus payouts as long as their performance in reducing
corruption meets or exceeds the threshold requirements of the corruption
variable. Qualifying for the bonus payouts may be more difficult if the
LDCs do not follow all or most of the policies that indirectly are associated
with reductions in corruption, yet in no way do they preclude the
politicians and bureaucrats within LDCs from qualifying for the incentive
bonuses.
B. Disbursement Structure
Another important component of a model incentive program is the
structure of the payments. One possibility is to impose step benchmarks.
Under this model, performance bonuses would not be paid out as a simple
linear function of performance, in the sense that greater reductions in
corruption would not incrementally increase the size of incentive bonuses.
Instead, the incentive bonus amounts would be fixed, but to receive the
bonus, politicians and bureaucrats would have to reduce corruption each
performance period (each year) until corruption levels are low. The
improvements in performance would have to exceed step thresholds or
benchmarks.
In addition, once public officials in an LDC meet the first threshold
step of improved performance, they would receive an incentive bonus
payout, but to obtain the second bonus payout they would have to
improve their performance over the previous year in order to meet the new
performance threshold. If politicians and bureaucrats in an LDC fail to
improve their performance enough in the following year, they would not
receive incentive bonuses. If their performance worsens, the threshold
rates of performance would not decrease the next year, and if their
performance improves but not by enough to qualify for the next incentive
bonus, the threshold rate in the next year would hold steady rather than
moving up to the next step or level. The performance-based financial
incentive program would end after thirty years of incentive bonuses have
been paid out. The gradually increasing, step nature of performance
thresholds would exist for the first five to ten years of an incentive
program - long enough not to expect insurmountably large reductions in
corruption in one year but not too long to impede momentum in reducing
corruption. Afterward, the public officials would have to meet or exceed
an unchanging high level of performance - i.e., a low level of corruption.
The amount that corruption would have to be reduced for each step
threshold to be met could be constant or could vary between thresholds.
The benefits of step benchmarks include the fact that the sizes of fixed
bonuses are easy to understand and publicize. Corruption would not have
to completely stop in order for public officials to meet the first performance
threshold. Rather, a small percentage of public officials would have to
cease being corrupt, or a larger group of public officials would have to
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reduce their corruption, or some combination of the two scenarios would
need to occur, in order for incentive bonuses to be paid to all eligible public
officials. Those that choose to reduce their corrupt activities would have
tools - the ability to dismiss, demote, reprimand, prosecute, apply peer
pressure, and/or inform on the corrupt public officials - to increase the
chances that they could meet the first performance threshold of reduced
corruption. While an increasing number of public officials would need to
reduce their corruption in order to meet future performance thresholds, the
higher the number of honest public officials, the more effectively they
would be able to use the above-mentioned tools to push for changes among
their corrupt peers and subordinates, and the more enticing the carrot of
incentive bonuses would become.
The fixed, straightforward, and explicit nature of step corruption
reduction performance thresholds also makes it more difficult for officials
to game the program. If bonuses were paid on a linear scale, with
incremental changes resulting in incremental bonuses, public officials
could be tempted to illicitly encourage those responsible for the public
measurements to artificially enhance their results on the margin, as each
small enhancement would amount to more money in the officials' pockets.
To attain a bonus in a step benchmark system, however, substantial
improvement must be made, and gaming large improvements is more
difficult than gaming small improvements. Public servants would not
know if they are collectively close to attaining a step performance
benchmark until after the performance period ends and the corruption
indicators are published. The inability of public servants to anticipate and
manipulate the measurement of their performance, especially given the
magnitude of the improvements they must be seen to make, would
frustrate efforts to influence measurements on the margin.
Step
benchmarks work well for measuring the reduction of corruption by public
officials because they require a significant improvement before the payout
of incentive bonuses and thus inspire public confidence that genuine
48
reductions in corruption have occurred.
While step performance benchmarks will be the assumed type of
benchmark throughout this Article, step performance benchmarks are not
necessarily superior to linear benchmarks. An attractive feature of using a
linear function to distribute incentive bonuses is that it would initially
make incentive bonuses more attainable. As even small reductions in
corruption would trigger incentive bonus payouts, a linear distribution
could encourage recalcitrant officials to participate in the program. In the
eyes of eligible public servants, such an initial bonus payout could cement
the founders' seriousness in backing the incentive program, making the
possibilities of very large incentive bonuses for decades more concrete and
hence more enticing.
Of course, a measurement function could be created that incorporates
48. Using Transparency International's CPI (described in note 43, supra) as an example of
an incentive program's measurement composite, each step benchmark could require, for
example, a 1.0 improvement on the CPI's zero to ten scale.
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both linear and step thresholds. For example, a linear function could
determine the size of incentive bonuses for a set number of years, or for a
set decrease in corruption, and subsequently a step function could be used
to determine whether the incentive bonuses are paid.
C. Eligible Public Officials
Whether or not bonuses are awarded under an incentive program in a
given year would depend on the collective overall success of all eligible
public officials within an LDC in reducing corruption, with individual
bonus amounts keyed to the position of each eligible politician or
bureaucrat. All politicians (presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members,
members of parliament, regional and local politicians), judges, and highlevel bureaucrats - roughly the top five or ten percent of bureaucrats best
positioned to exert pressure on others to stop being corrupt - would be
included in the incentive program. 49 The bonuses would be substantial multiples of the official salary of every politician and high-level bureaucrat
- and would be paid out collectively - either everyone initially deemed
eligible at the inception of the incentive program would receive an
incentive bonus in a given year or no one would receive a bonus. So, even
if a particular politician or bureaucrat governs immaculately, she would
not receive a performance bonus unless the entire LDC reduces corruption
enough collectively.50 Payouts based on collective improvements would
strongly encourage politicians and bureaucrats to pressure peers,
subordinates, and, at times, superiors to reduce corruption. 51
49. Rose-Ackerman's observations below suggest that comprehensive eligibility for all
politicians and high-level bureaucrats, as proposed here, would be preferable to including
only some politicians or only some high-level bureaucrats. She states: "The basic problem is
the enclave nature of many past efforts. Tax collectors and customs agents receive pay raises
and improved working conditions and win incentive bonuses. This works for awhile but then
begins to undermine morale elsewhere in government, causing resentment and risking a
backlash that can leave the government in worse shape than before. Either everybody else
gets a pay raise or the enclave of virtue is destroyed by resentful bureaucrats in the rest of

government."

SUSAN

ROSE-ACKERMAN,

CORRUPTION

AND

GOVERNMENT:

CAUSES,

CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 184 (1999).
50. A performance-based financial incentive program could theoretically be tailored to
each individual politician or bureaucrat within an LDC instead of distributing bonuses
collectively to all politicians and bureaucrats if their performance is high enough as a group.
Such tailoring would alleviate most of the uncertainty as to whether the politicians and
bureaucrats would collectively improve their performance by essentially eliminating all
possible collective action uncertainties. The largest difficulty with such a design is the
problem of how to monitor the performance of each politician and bureaucrat and to measure
it accurately. In the future some solution to this problem might present itself in the form of a
technological innovation, but as of now it seems as if this difficulty by itself would make
incentive programs tailored to individuals unfeasible. While the measurement problem is the
largest difficulty with this design option, it is not necessarily the only one. Incentive
programs tailored for individual public officials would not make use of the important peer
pressure among colleagues to improve their behavior and performance. If all a politician in
an LDC has to do to obtain her performance bonus is not be corrupt herself, she would have
little incentive to pressure her colleagues to improve.
51. There is a real likelihood that if both politicians and bureaucrats are eligible for
financial bonuses under a performance-based incentive program, the two groups would
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In determining which public sector officials should be included in an
incentive program, certain general factors need to be considered, such as
which public officials are the most influential or powerful and which
public officials, given the structure of their posts, can most effectively
pressure and persuade their peers, subordinates, or superiors to improve
their performance.
Numerous other factors that are unique to each LDC must also be
52
considered: specific institutional structures of individual governments,
differing salaries for government officials from one LDC to the next,
different price levels and income levels among LDCs, and the different
desires of citizens. Finally, the program must not adversely alter the
balance of power among different public officials or institutions.
D. Program Founders and Designers
Most likely those who fund an incentive program will also want to
design its specifics, but the two roles can be separately performed by
different groups. For example, if a group of individuals desires to fund an
incentive program, the program's legitimacy would be well served by
having a group of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private
foundations, developed countries, or the United Nations design and
administer the program. Regardless of who designs a performance-based
incentive program, advice on its structure should be welcomed from a
broad array of individuals, including academic experts, policymakers, and
NGO advocates in both DCs and LDCs who are familiar with the cultural,
historical, economic, social, and political climate of each of the LDCs as
well as with the views of those who may become eligible under the
incentive program.
The program would ideally be established and funded by a group of
countries acting in concert through international coalitions or institutions
like the United Nations. It could also be successfully funded, under certain
circumstances, by a combination of entities including private foundations,

monitor and successfully encourage or coerce each other to reduce corruption. Under a
performance-based incentive program in which politicians and certain bureaucrats receive
bonuses only if nationwide levels of corruption are significantly reduced, politicians would
have an incentive to carefully monitor and discipline any bureaucrats engaged in corrupt acts
because such acts could alter the chances that the politicians would collect their financial
bonuses. Likewise, bureaucrats through their collective power to oversee, investigate, audit,
record, publicize, judge, and prosecute politicians could encourage compliance with the
incentive program by politicians. Eligibility of both groups would be to their mutual
advantage, for mutual pressure would increase the likelihood that cleanup thresholds are met
and bonuses are paid out.
52. A mechanism might need to be created to address the issue of how an incentive
program should respond to a situation in which an LDC desires to add new political or highlevel bureaucratic positions within its government. For example, would more people be
eligible for bonuses under the incentive program? Would the lowest-level members eligible
for bonuses have their eligibility revoked to make room for the new high-level public
servants? Should no alterations be allowed to deter LDCs from creating unnecessary new
positions?
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NGOs, and/or individuals from developed or developing countries.5 3
International institutions could also cooperate with some of the
nongovernmental entities listed above.54
After the incentive program has been designed, an independent
oversight committee would run the incentive program. It would control
the program's funds and publicly disseminate all the performance
measurement data. The independent oversight committee would be
staffed by independent foreigners without a financial stake in the incentive
program.
E. Determining Which States Should Be Offered Performance-Based
Incentive Programs
When deciding where to establish incentive programs aimed at
reducing corruption, the three overriding issues to consider are: (1) the
need of an LDC to reduce corruption; (2) whether an LDC could
realistically benefit from such an incentive program; and (3) whether an
LDC's politicians are exceedingly depraved and despotic.
There are only a few LDCs that have relatively clean governments and
hence do not need the assistance of an incentive program aimed at
reducing corruption within their borders. Yet, the reality that corruption
reduction is desperately needed in many LDCs does not necessarily mean
that all of these LDCs are well situated to benefit from incentive programs
aimed at their public officials. Incentive programs for failed or war-torn
states like Somalia or Sudan, for example, would likely be impracticable. 55
Furthermore, politicians and bureaucrats in some LDCs might never be
motivated by the large financial bonuses associated with performancebased incentive programs. In some LDCs, especially those rich in oil or
minerals, there might just be too much to plunder. 56 For example, "around
US$55 billion was looted from Nigerian public funds during the Abacha
53. Even citizen savings accounts with the United Nations could be established where
citizens donate money to establish an incentive program for public officials within their own
country or to augment an existing program's incentive bonuses.
54. Members of a coalition attempting to establish one or more incentive programs could
challenge each other to fulfill funding commitments through grants conditional on the other
partners' success in raising their share of each program's capital. For example, a wealthy
individual could contribute 40% of the funding needed to establish an incentive program for a
developing country only if the United Nations or a developed country contributed the
remaining 60%. The offer could be valid for a limited or unlimited time period. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Mr. Buffett's Excellent Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A22 (Buffett has pledged $50
million for a nuclear fuel bank to be run by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but
"won't kick in his $50 million unless some government or governments ante up $100 million
in cash or fuel.").
55. In discussing the plight of the bottom billion, Collier discusses four traps: the conflict
trap, the natural resource trap, the land-locked with bad neighbors trap, and the bad
governance in a small country trap. See generally, COLLIER, supra note 4.
56. Of course, incentive bonuses could be dramatically increased in an attempt to make
the performance-based incentive program attractive to such public servants. This could
conceivably be a worthwhile endeavor after incentive programs are first established for all
other LDCs in need of them.
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dictatorship."57 It has been reported that "Mr. Abacha, during his period
as president, had a standing order to transfer $15m (E8.4m at current
exchange rates) a day of stolen funds to his Swiss bank account."58 Abacha
was legendarily infamous and in charge of a populous LDC that was a
major oil exporter. In such villainous cases where officials can steal such
staggering amounts from public coffers, an incentive program would
probably not be able to pay officials enough to persuade them to change
their behavior. Still, LDCs presently mining mineral riches should not be
ruled out as future participants in incentive programs, as they may be
encouraged to join after seeing successful programs in other LDCs.
Ultimately, even if incentive programs are implemented successfully in
only a few LDCs, the long-term benefits accruing to the poor in those
countries would be tremendous.
The public officials of some LDCs may be so exceedingly depraved and
despotic that establishing financial incentive programs for such LDCs is
insupportable. For example, LDCs whose leaders participate in systematic
acts of physical aggression against their own people should be excluded
from consideration, as the international community should not provide
funds to regimes involved in genocide or other horrific acts.
If the resources could be found, then establishing incentive programs
for ten LDCs simultaneously, each with tailored design aspects, would
provide a wealth of information as to how best to structure future incentive
programs. While the results may not be directly transposable into
incentive programs for other LDCs, the lessons learned could prove
invaluable.
F. Setting Compensation Levels
There are two approaches for determining how large incentive bonuses
should be in order to induce public officials to reduce corruption: setting
the bonus amounts just high enough to motivate LDC politicians and
bureaucrats to stop being corrupt, or setting them well above this
estimated level with the rationale that erring on the high side will increase
59
the likelihood of success.
Researching the amount of corruption at different levels of government
within an LDC will assist in setting the incentive bonus amounts for that

57. Oxfam, Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty Eradication 3, (Oxfam
Briefing Paper No. 002P0036, 2000), availableat http://publications.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam/
display.asp?K=002P0036&aub=Oxfam&sort=sort date/d&m=99&dc=113#descrip.
58. Duncan Campbell, Havens that Have Become a Tax on the World's Poor, GUARDIAN, Sept.
21, 2004, at 14.
59. Conceivably, the LDC politicians could be motivated to reform their ways by a bonus
amount that is substantially less than the amount they currently steal from the government or
solicit from citizens. This could be the case for numerous reasons, including: caving to
international or domestic pressure; wanting to clear their names or consciences; preferring
smaller streams of legal cash over larger streams of illegal cash because legal cash flows could
be freely and openly spent; or realizing that it would be less work to be paid to govern cleanly
than to cover up the paper trails of illegal activities.
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country. 60 Another helpful strategy could be to ask LDC politicians and
bureaucrats for their views on the size of effective incentive bonuses. Also,
the salaries of public officials in DCs and LDCs should be examined, taking
into account the cost of living in each country. I mention a few examples
below to give a sense of how much salaries can vary. After becoming
Bolivia's President, "Evo Morales cut his salary by more than half" to
$22,500 per annum. 61 In Kenya, a parliament member's salary "is about
$60,000 a year, rising to about double that amount if allowances are
included." 62 In the United States, the salary for a senator was $165,200 in
2006, while associate justices of the U.S. Supreme Court earned $203,000
that year. Singapore "believes so strongly that you have to get the bestqualified and least-corruptible people you can into senior positions in the
government, judiciary and civil service that its [sic] pays its prime minister
a salary of $1.1 million a year. It pays its cabinet ministers and Supreme
63
Court justices just under $1 million a year."
Incentive program designers could set bonus amounts using
algorithms with variables for different factors, such as existing salary
levels, once the appropriate data is collected for an LDC. Also, the
incentive bonuses should be indexed to inflation so as to not decrease over
time.
Compared to different developed countries' government expenditures,
the estimated cost of performance-based incentive programs is minimal.
For example, 2006 ODA from the "22 member countries of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee, the world's major donors," was

60. If research shows that politicians and bureaucrats in each LDC siphon off significantly
different amounts of money, such data could possibly be used to justify setting different
financial bonus amounts for different LDCs. This would, however, run the risk of creating
resentment among LDC officials. This concern has to be weighed against the fact that if
uniform bonus amounts are set across LDCs, the amounts might have to be close to or above
the amounts that the most-corrupt public officials take in each year to motivate as many of the
public officials as possible to participate. Given that LDCs have vastly different amounts of
government funds available for siphoning (compare oil-rich Nigeria, with over 149 million
people, to Malawi, with a population of over fourteen million and no significantly valuable
natural resources) the incentive payments necessary to effectively reduce corruption could
vary substantially. If the population and income differences among LDCs override the above
argument for uniform bonus amounts, performance-based financial incentive programs could
determine financial bonuses based on an LDC's population, income per capita, or other
indicator. Since each LDC differs in its number of politicians, judges, and high-ranking
bureaucrats, another possibility would be to set the overall budget for incentive bonuses for
each LDC according to its population and income per capita. I would like to thank Professor
Henry Hansmann for this suggestion.
61. AP, Peruvian President Lowers Salaries,Including His Own, TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006, at
7, availableat http:/ /www.taipeitimes.com/ News/ world/ archives/ 2006/08/02/2003321507.
62. Going Up or Down?, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 49, 52. "By comparison, the official
minimum wage is about $700 a year, GDP per head about $1,500. The very poorest, who slip
under the minimum wage threshold to take the most menial and casual jobs, earn less than
$200 a year." Id.
63. Thomas L. Friedman, Singapore and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A29. Even if
LDCs could afford to pay such salaries, incentive programs align incentives more effectively
because they do not automatically reward public servants; they reward public servants only if
they perform well.
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$103.9 billion. 64 If just 1/200th of this was used to fund a year's worth of
incentive bonus payouts in an LDC, the top 5,000 public officials could on
average each obtain roughly $100,000 - allowing the most senior officials
to collect multimillion dollar bonuses while lower level officials would still
obtain many multiples of their base salaries. Bonus figures are likely to be
comparable to or substantially greater than the equivalent politician or
bureaucrat salaries in most developed countries. This should not be cause
for alarm, however, because the pay of DC politicians and bureaucrats is
not set to pull the rich countries out of systemic corruption. Establishing
clean government costs more than maintaining entrenched norms of good
governance because the former requires working against the bad norm in
order to overhaul it, whereas the latter merely enforces the good norm in
maintaining clean governance.
G. Funding Incentive Programs
Besides setting the amount of incentive bonuses, numerous other
financial issues have to be addressed, such as how to fund incentive
programs. Three features of funding incentive programs would help to
ensure that the programs are credible from the perspective of developing
country public officials: (1) fully funding incentive programs from their
inception; 65 (2) establishing independent oversight committees to run
incentive programs; and (3) giving these committees control over the
programs' funds.
To ensure that an incentive program is fully funded from the outset,
those establishing the program would have to make a large, one-time
donation that could cover the cost of all bonuses for the length of the
program. Obviously, such a sum would be significantly larger than the
estimated cost of paying bonuses for one year. Yet, given that the present
value of distant bonuses is quite small, and assuming that the one-time
donation would be put into an investment fund until it is needed to meet
incentive bonus payouts, the cost would still be manageable. While it
might be difficult to convince donors to contribute all the funding up front,
the clear availability of the funds will reassure LDC public officials that if
they keep their end of the bargain by significantly reducing corruption, the
donors will honor their side of the deal. Further, after the initial funding
the incentive program would not require yearly infusions of cash.
64. OECD, Development Aid from OECD CountriesFell 5.1% in 2006 (Apr. 3, 2007), available
at http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,2340,de_- 2649_33721_38341265_1_1_1_1,00.html.
65. Various funding structures could guarantee that incentive programs would be fully
funded from their inception, though the cost of different funding structures would vary.
Also, funding methods are sensitive to investment return rates, interest rates, foreign
exchange risks, and the timing of bonus payouts - i.e., the longer it takes public officials to
qualify for bonus payouts, the less up-front funding of an incentive program would be
required. For example, it would take at least one year after the establishment of an incentive
program for bonuses to be paid out. During that year, the donated funds would likely be
earning positive investment returns. If one makes this assumption, then less cash would have
to be donated up front to fully fund the incentive program.
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Therefore, the most accurate comparison for evaluating the cost of an
incentive program is many years of traditional development assistance, not
simply one.
H. Physical Terror Default Clause
In Section E, I suggested that LDCs that physically persecute their own
citizens in a systematic manner should not have incentive programs
established for their public officials. Yet, even if public officials in an LDC
do not commit physical atrocities against citizens prior to the creation of an
incentive program, they could theoretically turn to sustained violence once
the program is in place. To ensure that a scenario would not arise in which
public officials are receiving incentive bonuses while systematically
persecuting citizens, a physical terror default clause should be strongly
considered as part of any incentive program. Essentially, if LDC public
officials or their surrogates deliberately and systematically physically
terrorize citizens, then public officials would not receive incentive bonuses,
regardless of how much they reduce corruption.
While any violence by state officials is reprehensible, the physical
terror default clause should probably target only extreme, widespread
violations - genocide and systemic use of torture, for example. It is sadly
unrealistic to expect that an LDC could stamp out all human rights abuses
caused by state agents. 66 Further, to make incentive programs attractive to
public officials in LDCs, those establishing the programs need to make
credible commitments to the public officials that if they significantly
abstain from padding their income through corrupt means, this loss of
income will be made up for through incentive bonuses. It must be made
clear to eligible public officials that a few bad acts beyond their control will
not defeat their chances of earning financial bonuses if they themselves do
everything they can to stem corruption. If the physical terror default clause
is triggered by the random or isolated acts of a few bad actors, public
officials could not be induced to take incentive programs seriously - they
would assume that such isolated violations could not be realistically
prevented. Also to this end, the actions that trigger the physical terror
default clause should be precisely defined in order to give LDC public
officials a clear understanding of the program's contours, and to dispel
concerns that the independent administrative committee of the incentive
program might use the clause as a pretext to withhold incentive bonuses.
A physical terror index could possibly be established for this purpose. 67
66. Theoretically, many other default clauses, such as a democracy default clause, could
be established. However, default clauses should be used with caution, as they could turn
incentive programs that aim to fight corruption into incentive programs that aim to solve
many or all LDC problems at once - an unrealistic challenge that would doom the initial
effort to substantially reduce corruption, and thus hurt advancements on other policy fronts
within the LDC as well. The physical terror default clause is aimed to prevent donors from
funding a potential Nazi Germany or genocidal Rwanda.
67. Such a composite index could draw on some or all of the following sources: HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009 (2009); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY
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I. Combining Incentive Programs with Other Anticorruption
Strategies and ODA
The numerous anticorruption strategies that have been attempted in
the past - including anticorruption task forces, legal protections for
whistle-blowers, freedom of information laws, governmental procurement
reform, ombudsman departments, and anti-money laundering laws have been unsuccessful in many countries because they are vulnerable to
capture by corrupt politicians and the bureaucrats who establish them. 68
The officials are able to give an appearance of propriety and positive
reform while continuing their corrupt business as usual. 69
Attempting to penalize politicians and bureaucrats for poor
performance or illicit activity is, of course, the opposite of distributing
incentive bonuses for good performance. If one ignores political economy
and how power is divided and used or abused by actors, it might seem that
a program meant to dole out sticks would be less expensive and more
effective than one that hands out carrots. Unfortunately, there is often little
hope for LDC politicians and bureaucrats to employ sticks effectively
against other public officials within their LDCs. 70 Those with power are
not eager to punish themselves, their political allies, or their bureaucratic
appointees. 71 Sticks can also be ineffective because of a shortage of
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2008 (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2007 (2008); and FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2008 (2008).

68. For an excellent summary and synthesis of the law and economics literature on
existing anticorruption strategies, see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 51. For some slightly more
recent law and economics literature that examines the relationship between the structural
foundations of government and corruption and hence has some possible implications for
anticorruption strategies, see generally John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions
and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 295 (2004)
(suggesting that unitary and parliamentary systems of government are associated with lower
levels of corruption than federal and presidential systems); Jana Kunicovi & Susan RoseAckerman, Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption, 35 BRIT. J.
POL. SC. 573 (2005) (finding empirical support for the claim that proportional representation
systems are associated with higher levels of corruption than plurality systems). Research
suggests that an effective anticorruption policy may be to increase women's participation in
the labor force and in parliament. See David Dollar et al., Are Women Really the "Fairer" Sex?
Corruption and Women in Government, 46 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 423 (2001) (finding a positive
association between representation of women in Parliament and lower levels of corruption
across a large sample of countries). Brunetti and Weder's regressions also suggest that a free
press reduces corruption. See Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free Press Is Bad News for
Corruption, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1801 (2003). For groundbreaking application of economic
principles to corruption, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1978).

69. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979) (using the language of "myth
system" and "operational code" to describe this phenomenon).
70. For example, the Supreme Court in Nepal "is bound up in the culture of impunity.
Earlier this year an unsuccessful litigant released recordings of his efforts to win a property
dispute through bribery. No action has been taken." Something Still Rotten, ECONOMIST, June
16, 2007, at 51.
71. For example, a program that required public officials to return 50% of their salaries if
collectively they did not meet certain performance benchmarks would never be passed, unless
it was assumed that all public officials would just continue to steal more government funds
and collect more bribes.
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competent personnel; there may simply not be enough qualified, skilled
72
individuals in LDCs to replace corrupt officials.
Thus, the prospects of performance penalties on their own are not
good. Yet numerous performance penalties may become quite effective
when combined with the anticorruption, performance-based incentive
bonuses discussed in this Article, as the prospect of incentive bonuses will
give those in charge of punishment-based anticorruption programs a
greater incentive to have their programs work. 73
Anticorruption
performance-based incentive programs should be simultaneously
implemented along with tough penalties for corruption in order to
maximize the prospect of giving the poor what is rightfully theirs - a
functioning government that serves to benefit the public good, not cripple
it.
Just as performance penalties targeting corruption can be made more
effective if paired with performance-based incentive bonuses, so ODA can
be made more effective if coupled with incentive programs for LDC public
officials. Coupling ODA with performance-based incentive programs for
LDC public officials would be maximally effective if traditional ODA
intended for distribution to LDC governments is also made contingent on
LDC public officials significantly reducing corruption. 74 This would take
away a source of potential funds (the ODA) for government officials to
steal, would make any distributed ODA much more likely to reach its
intended beneficiaries, and could invigorate LDC citizens' pressure on
public officials to clean up their act and earn the incentive bonuses, rather
than soliciting bribes or stealing from the public purse.

II.

INCENTIVE THEORY FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS

In this Part, I begin by laying out the basics of principal-agent theory
and how incentives can be used to better align the efforts of agents to the
desires of principals. Subsequently, I present the major reasons why
scholars believe high-powered, performance-based
incentives for
politicians and bureaucrats - large incentive bonuses relative to public
72. "'In 25 years, Africa will be empty of brains.' That dire warning, from Dr. Lalla Ben
Barka of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, reflects the growing alarm over Africa's
increasing exodus of human capital." Ainalem Tebeje, Brain Drain and Capacity Building in
Africa, Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-71249-201-1-DOTOPIC.html. "Ethiopia lost
75% of its skilled work force between 1980-91." Id.
73. To avoid giving corrupt public officials an incentive to cripple the program, an
amnesty for all corrupt acts committed prior to the establishment of the incentive program
should be considered.
74. Programs that condition ODA on reductions in corruption without incorporating
incentive payments for individual public officials, although intended to improve the
alignment between the interests of public officials and the public good, only minimally affect
that alignment, as the additional ODA, if released, would be directed towards LDC coffers,
rather than the officials themselves. An example of such contingent ODA is the U.S.
Millennium Challenge Corporation (www.mcc.gov), which aims to provide ODA to bettergoverned LDCs.
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servants' incomes - are problematic, and explain why these concerns are
overcome when the right performance variable - corruption by public
officials - is selected. 75
A. Principal-Agent Relationships
Principal-agent concerns present themselves when a principal - one
who entrusts responsibilities to another to act on her behalf in some
capacity - cannot easily monitor the activities of the agent - the
individual who has been entrusted to act on behalf of the principal. The
possibility of misaligned incentives is born from the separation of
ownership from control.
Lack of monitoring produces opportunities for the agent to maximize
her own benefit, if she is so inclined, at the principal's expense. Such
opportunities exist because it is expensive for principals to monitor agents.
Theoretically, principals should monitor their agents until the marginal
cost of monitoring equals the marginal return that principals receive from
76
an extra amount of monitoring.
One way a principal can mitigate an agent's shirking of her duties is to
threaten to dismiss or not re-elect the agent. To motivate an agent to not
shirk, the principal can also offer inducements or incentives to the agent
that are linked to her performance. 77 These incentives are in addition to the
base level of compensation that the agent receives for completing tasks for
the principal. They are contingent on good performance, which is defined
as exceeding some performance benchmark established by the principal.
These performance-based incentives are meant to reinforce the existing
incentive that an agent has to act in the best interests of the principal keeping her job.
In this Article, the politicians and bureaucrats are the agents, while
citizens are the principals. 78 Politicians and bureaucrats are confronted
with an incentive to perform in the best interests of others - holding on to
75. For excellent overviews of incentive programs in the public sector, which I rely upon
significantly in this Part, see Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizationsin the Public Sector: An
Interpretative Review, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 696 (2002), or Simon Burgess & Marisa Ratto, The
Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence, 19 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 285
(2003).
76. The difficulties of monitoring are compounded if there are numerous principals
because of a collective action problem. If no effective mechanism exists to share the costs of
monitoring evenly among all principals, then it is not rational for any principal to monitor the
agents past the point at which her marginal cost of monitoring equals her marginal return
from monitoring. Most likely, her individual efficient amount of monitoring will be below the
group's efficient amount of monitoring if all principals could effectively share the costs of
monitoring.
77. "The concept of performance-based pay is so intuitively appealing that it seems almost
ludicrous to disagree with it." Christopher M. Lowery et al., Employee Perceptions of the
Effectiveness of a Performance-Based Pay Program in a Large Public Utility, 24 PUB. PERSONNEL
MGMT. 475, 475 (1995).
78. While, strictly speaking, bureaucrats will be the agents of politicians at times, this fact
does not complicate my analysis, which stresses citizens as the ultimate principals of both
politicians and bureaucrats.
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their jobs. Yet performance-based incentive programs could be established
to better align the interests of politicians and bureaucrats with the interests
of a country and its citizens.
B. Solving the Limitations of Incentive Programs in the Public
Sector for LDCs
Performance-based incentive programs have been and continue to be
significantly more prevalent in the for-profit, private sector than within
government,79 even though some scholars have concluded that
"bureaucrats respond to performance incentives."80 Those who study the
feasibility of using performance-based incentives within public
organizations generally agree that the challenges to successful
implementation are greater in the public sector than in the private sector.
This is true because of the complexities involved in conceiving and
structuring public incentive programs that provide for the differences
between the public and private sectors and the different situations that
arise within various types of public organizations. If public incentive
programs are not tailored to the public sector, they will most likely have
different, possibly negative, outcomes than when implemented in the
private sector.
Numerous issues make high-powered, performance-based incentive
programs difficult to implement in the public sector, including multiple
principals, multiple tasks needing to be performed by agents, the risk of
gaming or capture, measurement difficulties, teamwork, risk aversion, and
nonpecuniary motivations. Some of these issues, like teamwork, are
present in both the public and private sectors to roughly the same degree.
Others, like measurement difficulties, are present in both the public and
private sectors, but harder to manage in the public sector. Regardless, each
of these challenges can be overcome in the context of the performancebased incentive programs described in this Article.
An incentive program designed to motivate LDC politicians and
bureaucrats to reduce corruption is unlike most incentive programs
contemplated by scholars in the past because it assumes the worst of LDC
politicians and bureaucrats. In developed countries, performance-based
incentive programs in the public sector aim to get government bureaucrats
to improve their work beyond an already relatively high level of
achievement. For example, British medical doctors are generally perceived
to be capable and hardworking, so incentive programs aimed at their
profession are difficult to design because they must aim to increase the
79. See generally Simon Burgess & Paul Metcalfe, The Use of Incentive Schemes in the Public
and Private Sectors: Evidence from British Establishments (Ctr. for Mkt. & Pub. Org., Working
Paper No. 00/15,1999), availableat http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/
wp15.pdf.
80. James Heckman et al., Assessing the Performance of Performance Standards in Public
Bureaucracies,87 AM. ECON. REV. 389, 393 (1997). This study notes, however, that bureaucrats'
responses are not necessarily those that the programs intended.
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productivity of already productive, hardworking public servants. This is a
laudable goal, but it is also very different from attempting to get public
officials to no longer steal from public coffers or demand bribes from the
public. The expectation gulf between the quality of governance in DCs and
LDCs opens up space for a performance-based incentive program that is
less vulnerable to gaming and waste than incentive programs within DCs.
Using corruption as the measurement variable in LDCs solves the
challenge of transposing incentive programs to the public sector, yet this
measurement variable would not significantly help citizens in, say,
Denmark or Finland.
1. Multiple Principals
In the private sector, employees usually have only one principal - one
superior to whom they must report. This employee-boss relationship
repeats itself all the way up the company's organizational ladder to the
CEO, who is the agent of the company's directors, who in turn are agents
of the shareholders. This neatly structured, principal-agent pyramid
cannot be easily grafted onto the public sector; in fact, several scholars
identify the existence of multiple principals in an organizational structure
as a defining characteristic of public bureaucracies. 81 While bureaucracies
can look like the hierarchical pyramids commonly found in large
corporations, the public employees within bureaucracies "often serve
several masters: these may include the users of the service, payers for the
service, politicians at different levels of government, and professional
organizations." 82 This public sector structure was designed "to provide
83
checks and balances against biased or arbitrary exercise of power."
When multiple principals do not cooperate, it is difficult to create welldesigned incentive programs because each principal might only be
concerned with a few aspects of the agent's work, and collectively the
4
different interests of the multiple principals will probably not coincide.8
So, if a principal offers inducements to an agent to perform better on only
the fraction of the agent's work that interests the principal, then the
principal simultaneously encourages the agent to put less effort into tasks
that are valuable to other principals (these other tasks are referred to as
"substitutes"). Given numerous principals, the theory assumes that "each
principal observes the outcome of all tasks" of the agent and "can offer

81. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 236-37 (1989).
82. Carol Propper & Deborah Wilson, The Use and Usefulness of PerformanceMeasures in the
Public Sector, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 250, 251 (2003).
83. Avinash Dixit, Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 378, 381 (1997).
84. "There are good reasons for [principals'] failure to cooperate - they have to arrange
to share the resulting aggregate gains, and find it difficult to make credible commitments
needed for this, especially when they have widely divergent interests and regard one another
with enmity and distrust." Avinash Dixit, Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politicsfor LessDeveloped Countries, 15 ECON. & POL. 107, 128 (2003).
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marginal rewards or penalties based on all observations" such that
each principal offers a customary positive marginal payment for
the output that is of relatively greater concern to him, and a
negative marginal payment, which acts like an insurance for the
output risk (and therefore the agent's income risk) associated with
85
the task that is of relatively greater concern to the other principal.
An example of this is when Congress "threatens to reduce the funding of
an agency," such as the National Endowment for the Arts, because
Congress believes the agency is catering to artists or art critics instead of
paying attention to the desires of Congress itself. 86 The principals' offers of
positive and negative marginal payments net out, creating weak positive
incentives on all the tasks for the agent. 87 Incentives can be strengthened if
one can eliminate either of the two assumptions above - if one can ensure
that principals only observe, or that principals can only offer marginal
incentives to the agent based on, the outcomes that interest them. 88 Yet
modifying either of the two assumptions through "compartmentalization
may be impracticable in an open political system or when the principals are
top-level players such as the legislature or the executive whose actions
cannot be restrained by an outside force." 89 The conclusion often reached
in the literature is that, given multiple principals in the public sector, the
incentives offered to government bureaucrats should be less substantial
than the incentives offered to for-profit private sector employees. 90
This conclusion does not apply to the kind of program proposed here,
for the diversity of interests among multiple principals is not relevant to an
incentive program requiring agents to cut back on the practice of
corruption. An incentive program focused on the reduction of corruption
does not get bogged down in trying to determine how agents should
appropriately balance their efforts to fulfill the legitimate demands of all
their principals - it leaves this balancing act untouched because its criteria
apply across the board and do not favor one principal over another.
Further, such an incentive program does not place any new burden on the
agents because it rewards restraint; it does not take more time on the part
of the agent to be less corrupt. Indeed, it might take less. The amount of
time corrupt public servants spend identifying resources to steal, sizing up
which citizens to solicit bribes from, covering their tracks, recruiting other
public servants into their illegal schemes, determining where to park their
illegal proceeds, etc., should not be underestimated. Under the incentive
program proposed here, public servants will spend significantly less time
soliciting bribes and siphoning off government resources and redirect their
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 126.
Dixit, supra note 75, at 710.
See Dixit, supra note 84, at 126.
See Dixit, supra note 75, at 710.
Id.
Propper & Wilson, supra note 82, at 252.
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efforts toward monitoring their peers and subordinates to make sure they
do the same. Ultimately, the reduction of corruption should increase the
time and effort devoted to all policy areas and interests.
For this reason, less high-powered incentives are not a necessary or
even appropriate response to the existence of multiple principals in all
cases in which incentive programs are established in the public sector. In
fact, very high-powered incentives on the order of tens or hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more can be optimal inducements if an appropriate
performance variable can be found. An appropriate performance variable
- like corruption levels - that does not skew the calculation public
officials must make about how much effort they should exert to meet the
demands of all their legitimate principals.
2. Multiple Tasks and Goals
Unlike in the private sector, where the profit motive is often viewed as
the sole goal, most public sector employees are faced with multiple tasks
and/or multiple goals. A concern with designing incentive programs in
the public sector is that multiple goals or tasks for agents can be in conflict
with each other, much like the case of multiple principals, described above,
in the sense that the introduction of incentive bonuses "serves to direct the
allocation of the agents' attention among their various duties." 91 If tasks are
substitutes, then high-powered incentive programs will be undesirable
because "exerting more effort on one task increases the marginal cost of the
task which is a substitute. Higher marginal incentives in one task will
92
drive the agent's effort away from the tasks which are substitutes."
Further, "the desirability of providing incentives for any one activity
decreases with the difficulty of measuring performance in any other
activities that make competing demands on the agent's time and attention"
because agents would inappropriately focus their efforts on the activities
93
that were more accurately measured.
In situations where goals or tasks are substitutes and where measuring
errors vary across different tasks, the traditional response is to have less
high-powered incentives so as not to overly aggravate the possible
negative effects of either.
But this concern is not applicable to a
performance-based financial incentive program for LDC public servants
with corruption as the performance variable.
Fortunately, a performance-based incentive program that distributes a
collective bonus to politicians and bureaucrats if their LDC becomes less
corrupt does not face any of the potential suboptimal results described
above because the performance variable is not a substitute for other agent
tasks - it does not create trade-offs because it does not require any
91. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts,Asset Ownership and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 25 (1991).
92. Burgess & Ratto, supra note 75, at 287. Conversely, high-powered incentives would be
appropriate in cases where the multiple tasks were complements.
93. See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 91, at 26.
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additional time or exertion. 94 Reducing corruption is about performing all
existing tasks more honestly, not about spending more time achieving
some goals at the expense of other legitimate goals.
3. Gaming and Capture
Another potential difficulty with creating incentive programs for
public officials is selecting performance measures that are difficult for
agents to manipulate. 95 This manipulation can take many forms, including
gaming,
capture,
myopia,
tunnel
vision,
measure
fixation,
misrepresentation, and misinterpretation. 96 Such behavior can occur if
public servants react to incentive programs by pursuing their own benefit
in a harmful manner that contradicts the goals of the incentive program.
Unsurprisingly, given the many ways government employees can shirk in
response to performance measures, the traditional response of the
academic literature is to call for less high-powered incentives. Yet, the
performance-based incentive program described in these pages
significantly minimizes the risk that public servants will be able to game or
capture the incentive program because: (1) independent outsiders will
evaluate the progress of the politicians and bureaucrats, not the public
servants themselves; (2) a distinct set of independent outsiders will
comprise the autonomous administrative committee; and (3) numerous
performance measurements will be used to gauge corruption - the
performance variable. These measures would make it simply not worth
public servants' time to attempt to game the performance measures and/or
attempt to game the views of thousands of differently situated individuals
94. The academic literature concentrates only on incentive programs for bureaucrats, not
politicians. The source of this void is most likely the belief that the concerns articulated and
dispelled here when corruption is used as the performance variable would be more difficult to
overcome for politicians than for bureaucrats. Performance-based incentive programs with
corruption as the performance variable would effectively motivate both politicians and
bureaucrats. For a spoof piece on the topic, see Benjamin J. Stein, A Bonus Poolfor the President,
ACROSS THE BOARD, Oct. 1992, at 54. There are no real-world examples, to my knowledge, of
performance-based financial incentive programs for politicians. There is an annual prize "to
retired African leaders who rule well and then stand down, rather than trying to cling to
power." Face Value, Africa Calling, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 74. This prize, the Mo
Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, can be awarded to only one leader a
year after her retirement. Further, candidates will only be eligible if they took "office through
proper elections and left having served the constitutional term stipulated when taking office."
The prize awards $500,000 per annum for a period of ten years, and $200,000 annually
thereafter. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Questions, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/ques
tions.asp (last visited May 23, 2008). This beneficial and laudable prize, which is like an
employee of the year award, is a different and much weaker instrument than a performancebased incentive program for thousands of public officials, payable while they are still in
public service.
95. For an amusing gaming example in the private sector, see Norman D. Fast & Norman
A. Berg, The Lincoln Electric Company, Harvard Business School Case 376, at 6 (July 29, 1983)
(Fast and Berg chronicle an incentive program by Lincoln Electric that paid secretaries a piece
rate for each key they typed. One secretary responded by repeatedly striking the same key
during lunch.).
96. See generally Peter C. Smith, On the Unintended Consequences of Publishing Performance
Data in the Public Sector, 18 IN'LJ. PUB. ADMIN. 277 (1995).
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whose responses constitute the data on corruption for the different publicly
reported performance measures.
First, it will be difficult for the public servants to game the performance
measurements, especially on a large-scale basis, because the public
servants would neither report nor evaluate their own performance. In
numerous examples of incentive programs for public officials in developed
countries, public servants under the incentive program were at least
partially responsible for reporting their own progress on the criteria laid
out by the incentive program. For example, Courty and Marschke
examined the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 and determined that
"training agencies time the reporting of the trainee's performance
outcomes to maximize their [own] incentive awards." 97 They acknowledge
that "one could argue, however, that the costs... identif[ied] are specific to
a poorly designed incentive system and that these costs could be easily
reduced or even eliminated under alternative designs." 98 Since the public
servants under the program proposed here do not measure or report their
performance figures, they cannot misrepresent or misinterpret the numbers
by, for example, selectively reporting figures or timing the reporting of
relevant data.
Second, since all the performance measurements will be reported to the
public, it will also be very difficult for politicians and bureaucrats in an
LDC to successfully convince the independent administrative committee
that oversees the incentive program to doctor the numbers on their behalf.
The mandate of when and under what circumstances the committee must
pay out incentive bonuses will be very clear and will also be public
knowledge. Further, the fact that the committee will be composed of
independent foreigners will make it even more difficult for public officials
eligible for incentive bonuses under the incentive program to successfully
game or capture the committee because independent outsiders will be less
susceptible to pressure.
Third, public servants will also find it very difficult to game the
publicly reported performance measures because of: (1) the sheer number
of different performance measures used to gauge corruption, and (2) the
large number of individuals consulted to determine each performance
measure. It is one thing to attempt to game one performance measurement
but quite another to try to skew a dozen simultaneously, just as it is
conceivable that politicians in an LDC could intimidate some domestic
policy experts but less likely that they could also sway the views of foreign
policy experts, domestic businesspeople, foreign businesspeople, and
citizens. 99 Essentially, politicians and bureaucrats eligible under a financial
97. Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to
Explicit PerformanceIncentives, 22 J.LAB. ECON. 23, 49 (2004).
98. Id. at 50.
99. Every incentive program will potentially have some actors attempting to game it. This
will probably be no different for performance-based financial incentive programs for
politicians and high-level bureaucrats in LDCs, though their attempts will most likely be less
successful. Small-scale gaming could lead to some unjust compensation if public officials who
are collectively on the cusp of meeting performance thresholds unfairly attempt to manipulate
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incentive program have two alternatives: they can pressure their peers and
subordinate colleagues to reduce corruption and receive years' worth of
handsome financial incentive bonuses, or they can try to pressure the
thousands of people who collectively rate their performance, many of
whom they will never know, many of whom do not live in the same
country as they do, many of whom are powerful, and many of whom
might not hesitate to go to the press to publicize any attempt at unjust
interference with the surveys and polls.
In addition to being virtually impracticable, this second option trying to game or pressure thousands of evaluators - also leaves
politicians and bureaucrats vulnerable to losing years' worth of incentive
bonuses because it would be difficult and perilous to successfully
manipulate the performance measurements for one year, let alone year
after year. So, even if politicians and bureaucrats in an LDC somehow
managed to scam the incentive program to get one year of bonus payouts,
it is unlikely that they could do so repeatedly. Politicians and bureaucrats
inclined to game the incentive program would likely realize the ultimate
futility of doing so and understand that if they want to become wealthy
legitimately, and possibly transform their images, in the eyes of some, from
pariahs to officials deserving of (at least some) respect, a strategy of
encouraging and pressuring their peers and subordinates into reducing
corruption is far more effective than a strategy of manipulation and
gaming. 100
Further, unlike improving one's performance under an incentive
program that monitors one's success at performing complicated surgeries,
which requires perfecting certain skills, or at placing unemployed
individuals into jobs, which can be largely dependent on external
resources, it does not take much effort, time, or talent to reduce one's own
illicit stealing of government funds or to stop oneself from soliciting bribes.
Thus, a public servant would not be incentivized to turn to manipulation
simply because she cannot perform the task at hand well.
Other attempts at manipulation would also be unlikely to succeed.
Myopia seems improbable given that an incentive program would pay out
years' worth of incentive bonuses if performance thresholds are met.l0'
Additionally, it has already been shown above that gaming, the
multitasking nature of public sector work would be an insignificant
concern given that not engaging in corrupt acts does not detract from the
amount of effort a public official devotes to different tasks. Finally, given
the performance measurements. Yet, even if a small amount of this goes on, it will go on at
the margins and will indicate that a large improvement in reducing corruption will have
already taken place. These large improvements would need to occur to get the public officials
anywhere close to meeting the performance thresholds required of them to receive bonus
payouts.
100. The desire of politicians and bureaucrats to genuinely help their fellow citizens must
also be considered. While altruistic desires have in and of themselves not been enough to
stem the tide of corruption, they most likely will play a supporting role in tilting the above
calculation toward the reduction of corruption over a policy of gaming the incentive program.
101. Unless public officials are not sure whether they can keep their jobs. While
bureaucrats would generally not have to worry about such a prospect, some politicians might.
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that it takes little effort or time to not partake in corruption, tunnel vision
10 2
and measure fixation are unlikely to be major concerns.
Some scholars have suggested that since principals only learn how
agents respond to incentive programs over time, principals should allow
performance measures to evolve - to change over time to respond to
gaming and to more effectively address the goal at hand.10 3 While
performance-based incentive programs for LDC public officials that aim to
reduce corruption could theoretically include such a prescription, it will
likely be unnecessary given the nature of the performance variable and the
different performance measurements used to gauge it. Unlike counting the
output of a factory, the corruption performance measurements would be
subtle and, as Hanushek et al. describe in their work on incentives,
"flexible enough to avoid manipulation yet objective enough to be
politically feasible" 1°4 because the experts doing the counting could easily
factor any gaming into their measurements. For example, if business or
policy experts are annually consulted for their opinions about the level of
corruption within a particular LDC, their answers would incorporate all
the information that they have accumulated in the past year. They would
not be bound to base their opinion on only one factor, but instead will
consider many complex factors - thus decreasing the ability of eligible
public officials to game the incentive program. 05 Further, the neutral
experts will not be forced to rely on easily gamed factors but will select
10 6
data for evaluation.
4. Performance Measurement Difficulties
A performance measurement's value depends on how much distortion
and risk it creates - the less of each generated, the better the performance
measurement.10 7 Yet, as George Baker suggests, "many complex issues in
the design of real-world incentive contracts can be fruitfully viewed as
102. Politicians and bureaucrats should devote time to monitoring their subordinates and
peers. The amount of devoted time should depend on their position - e.g., someone who is
part of an anticorruption task force would devote more time to monitoring than a low-level
clerk.
103. Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, Dynamics of Performance-MeasurementSystems, 19
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 268, 281 (2003).

104. Eric Hanushek et al., Introduction to the JHR's Special Issue on Designing Incentives to
Promote Human Capital,37 J. HUM. RESOURcES 693, 695 (2002).
105. On his travels, Paul Theroux recalls "news of an attempted coup in the capital,
Lilongwe. This might have been alarming, but I guessed it was the usual ruse, a pretext to
arrest members of the opposition and an inspiration for the police to squeeze travelers at
roadblocks." Such accounts demonstrate that public officials could not successfully game
incentive programs because of the reasons mentioned above - policy experts and other
evaluators would understand the true nature of the events and judge appropriately. PAUL
THEROUx, DARK STAR SAFARI: OVERLAND FROM CAIRO TO CAPE TOWN 284 (2003).

106. Plus, if public officials somehow find a way to game the less flexible corruption
performance measures - such as a poll asking LDC citizens whether they or anyone they
know has been solicited for a bribe in the past year - the more complex and subtle corruption
performance measurements could detect and offset this gaming.
107. See generally George Baker, Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts, 37 J.
HUM. RESOURcES 728 (2002).
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tradeoffs between these two features of performance measures." l'8
Distortion arises from forms of manipulation like gaming, while risk is
derived from the fact that if a performance measurement does not
accurately capture the agent's effort by failing to "adjust for factors
outside" 10 9 the agent's control, it leaves the agent more vulnerable to not
being properly compensated for her effort.
In Section B.3, it was demonstrated that public officials will have a
difficult time successfully manipulating an incentive program that ties
incentive bonus payouts to decreasing levels of corruption because of the
nature of corruption as a performance variable and the multiplicity of
performance measurements.
Gaming the multitasking nature of
governmental work was shown to not be a concern because providing
anticorruption incentives to public officials does not skew or negatively
alter their performance on other tasks, given that it takes little effort to not
partake in corruption. Further, it was argued that gaming or capture
would not be a serious problem because: (1) public servants will not be
involved in measuring or reporting the performance measurements;
(2) numerous different performance measurements will be used to measure
corruption, which will incorporate the input of many individuals with
diverse geographical and professional backgrounds; and (3) the
autonomous administrative committee will consist of independent
outsiders.
Reason two above ensures not only that gaming will be difficult to pull
off but that the performance measurements will collectively provide an
accurate aggregate reading of the level of corruption in an LDC, thus
effectively minimizing performance measurement distortions. Given that
corruption will, for practical reasons discussed below, be measured on a
country level and not on an individual level, public officials must bear
some risk that aggregate corruption indicators will not be an accurate
reflection of their individual decision not to be corrupt, even though their
act of forsaking corruption will contribute to lower overall corruption
scores. This risk is not unique to incentive programs using aggregate
corruption figures but rather present in all group incentive programs. It is
expected, given performance measurements' trade-off between distortion
and risk." 0 Further, the trade-off can be minimized because officials have
the tools - the threat of dismissal, demotion, prosecution, etc. - to
pressure their peers and subordinates to meet reduction goals.'
Using high-powered incentives is only deemed advisable when
2
performance measures accurately gauge their intended variable."
Heinrich points out that "agency theory suggests that this finding is even
more relevant for a high performance bonus system with aggregate (for
108. Id. at 728.
109. Carolyn J. Heinrich, False or FittingRecognition? The Use of High Performance Bonuses in
Motivating OrganizationalAchievements, 26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 284 (2007).
110. See Baker, supra note 107, at 744-45.
111. Teamwork is discussed infra, Section B.5.
112. Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in Firms, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 14
(1999).
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example, state-level) measures of performance, where there are fewer
competing agents by which to assess effort levels and more distinctive
organizational or environmental contexts that influence performance
113
outcomes."
However, the quality of corruption performance measures does not
meaningfully depend on the fact that there are "fewer competing agents by
which to assess effort levels" 114 because corruption performance measures
do not measure productive output by public servants but rather measure a
specific type of unproductive effort. For example, understanding a
surgeon's skill, taking into account all relevant variables like the sickness
and age of patients, depends to a significant degree on the success rates of
other surgeons operating on similarly situated patients. But in the realm of
measuring corruption, we already know what excellence is - minimal
corruption.
Given the nature of the performance variable and its measurements,
the value of aggregate or countrywide corruption performance measures is
also not hampered by "more distinctive organizational or environmental
contexts that influence performance outcomes."' 115 It would be very costly
and difficult to find enough diverse and reliable sources of data to
accurately measure the corrupt proclivities of individual public servants i.e., to find many individuals who have interacted with a particular public
servant and to find enough variation in these individuals' situations in
terms of, for example, occupation. Plus, we would be unable to accurately
disaggregate how public officials influence each other in terms of
corruption. Using many performance measures that assess corruption on
the national level substantially minimizes these difficulties. We can obtain
a more accurate picture of corruption at the national level than at the level
of individual public officials because we can more easily survey thousands
of individuals' experiences with corruption when dealing with
government, we can more easily get opinions from a very wide range of
individuals, and this method does not require us to accurately disaggregate
how "distinctive organizational or environmental contexts . . . influence
performance outcomes." 116 It also does not call for us to measure how
public officials influence each other's tendency to be corrupt because we
would be interested in the total amount of national corruption, not
corruption by individual public officials. Further, the use of both
experiential data (such as asking 3,000 random citizens in an LDC whether
they or anyone living in their household has been asked to pay a bribe in
the last year) and subjective measurements (such as asking an academic
who specializes in Central America to rate the different levels of corruption
in the region) poses no unique or added difficulties in measurement
compared to similar experiential and subjective measurements of other
social phenomena. 1 7 While perfect measurements of social phenomena
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Heinrich, supra note 109, at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Christopher Woodruff, Measuring Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL
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cannot be had, corruption can be measured accurately enough to
successfully construct incentive programs with corruption as the
118
performance variable.
5. Teamwork
Awarding incentive bonuses based on the performance of a team or
group is generally not as optimal as providing incentives to individuals
based on their own individual effort. This is because members of a group
may be induced to free-ride if the group's product depends on the
collective effort.11 9 The larger the team, the more prevalent free-riding may
become. 120 Yet team incentive bonuses have been shown to be effective
motivational tools, 121 and some commentators "see many examples of team
incentives chosen by firms and public organizations." 122 In addition, teams
may be able to create their "own reward or punishment mechanism such as
123
a social norm to overcome [the free rider problem]."
Depending on the nature of the performance variable and its
performance measurements, as discussed above, as well as potential
resource constraints, an incentive program's best option may be to rely on
team or group incentives over incentives for individuals. For example,
while the sales performance of individual traveling salesmen may be
accurately and inexpensively recorded, it makes less sense to attempt to
measure how corrupt individual public officials are, given the cost and
logistical difficulties that such an endeavor would entail.
Burgess and Ratto state that a "key feature of team rewards is that they
may induce peer monitoring . . . and hence reduce the extent of freeriding." 124 This would likely happen on two fronts. First, given that many
peers would comprise the group of public officials eligible for incentive
bonuses, peer monitoring would put pressure on individuals within the
ON THE EcoNoMics OF CORRUPTION 105 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006)
(arguing that perception-based, subjective indices like the CPI or the World Bank's
governance indicators are better than objective attempts to measure corruption given the gulf
between the law on the books and the law in practice).
118. In The Performance of Performance Standards, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith make a
further point about the accuracy of performance measures: "performance systems that have
been tried in the past have generally used short-run target measures that are only weakly
related to long-run efficiency measures. If performance standards are to be put in place that
motivate efficiency, long-term studies should be conducted to determine which short-run
measures are strongly related to long-term efficiency criteria." This lack of correlation should
not be an issue for performance measurements that gauge corruption within an LDC because
long-run success is intricately tied to short-run improvements and measurements. James J.
Heckman et al., The Performanceof PerformanceStandards, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 778, 809 (2002).
119. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazardin Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982).
120. See id.
121. See generally Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & David B. Balkin, Effectiveness of Individual and
Aggregate Compensation Strategies, 28 INDUS. REL. 431 (1989). Gomez-Mejia and Balkin find that
"there was little evidence that the 'free rider' effect was a major problem with the use of
aggregate incentives for R&D employees." Id. at 444.
122. Burgess & Ratto, supra note 75, at 289.
123. Dixit, supra note 75, at 707.
124. Burgess & Ratto, supra note 75, at 290.
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group to stop being corrupt because all of their individual incentive
bonuses would be tied to the group's ability to reduce corruption in the
LDC. Second, given that all the individuals comprising the top of the
political and bureaucratic hierarchy would be eligible for incentive bonuses
through the performance-based incentive program, intense monitoring of
125
subordinates by superiors could occur at all levels of the hierarchy.
Politicians and high-level bureaucrats could rely on the power bestowed
on them through their positions to pressure lower-level public officials through the threat of demotions, sanctions, termination, and/or criminal
prosecution - to stop being corrupt.126 Further, with the establishment of
an incentive program in their country, citizens could also become a
significant source of pressure on public officials to reform their ways and
reduce corruption.127 Thus, many public officials eligible for incentive
bonuses might feel pressure not only from peers and superiors, but also
from the public. Finally, given that free-riding in this situation (i.e., being
corrupt) would constitute a criminal act, peers, superiors, and citizens
would have much stronger tools - numerous anticorruption measures than most individuals have at their disposal within a team when others are
free-riding. These once largely ineffective anticorruption measures would
gain sharp teeth with the introduction of incentive programs because those
responsible for enforcing the measures would have a large incentive to
effectively do so: the possibility of years of substantial incentive bonuses. 128
6. Risk-Averse Agents
The simple agency scenario in the private sector assumes that agents
are risk-neutral, but it is often assumed that bureaucrats in the public
sector are risk-averse, as public officials cannot "easily diversify the risks of
bad outcomes of public policies and agencies." 129
If government
employees are risk-averse, then they will prefer less sharp incentives meaning that public officials will prefer a larger percentage of their salaries
to be guaranteed base pay and a smaller percentage to be dependent on
125. A possible structural variation could be added to performance-based incentive
programs to intensify the power of peer monitoring - granting public officials the power to
deny their colleagues bonus payouts by a large supermajority vote. Requiring a large
supermajority vote would substantially minimize the risk of abusing such a power. The
criteria that would lead to the denial of bonuses could be left to the discretion of public
servants jointly.
126. Making more public officials eligible for incentive bonuses would directly motivate
more public officials to stop being corrupt (those newly included under the incentive
program). As performance-based incentive programs for LDC public officials rely on both
peer monitoring pressure and superior-subordinate monitoring pressure, the increase in the
number of eligible public officials would not necessarily weaken the amount of monitoring
pressure applied by each eligible public official. Even if a reduction in monitoring pressure
per eligible public official occurred by an expansion of the eligible group, the aggregate
amount of applied monitoring pressure could still increase given the added applied pressure
from newly eligible public servants.
127. This point was first discussed in the Introduction.
128. See Part I, supra, for a fuller examination of this point.
129. Dixit, supra note 75, at 699.
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incentive bonuses than risk-seeking or risk-neutral individuals. 130 The
same will be true if an agent's outcome is partially determined by factors
beyond her control, factors that do not have to do with her skill or level of
exertion. 131 Once again, this does not rule out the effective use of
incentives; it only suggests that less high-powered incentives should be
offered to the bureaucrats.
Public officials' risk profile will partially determine their willingness to
continue to be corrupt versus their willingness to reform their behavior in
hopes of qualifying for incentive bonuses. They would have to weigh the
risks of persisting in breaking the law (particularly given the increased
oversight of their colleagues) against the risk that, even if they do all they
can individually to cut back corruption, the LDC still might not meet its
performance benchmark to trigger bonus payouts. Regardless of the risk
preference of LDC politicians and bureaucrats, the success of an incentive
program aimed at reducing corruption does not entirely depend on the risk
profile of agents because public servants' official salaries will not be
reduced if they become eligible for incentive bonuses under newly
established performance-based incentive programs.
7. Nonpecuniary Motivations
Numerous scholars have claimed that a danger with creating
performance-based financial incentive programs for public officials is that
officials devoted to public service at the outset will over time view
themselves less and less as heroes or knights who serve the public
132
primarily out of an altruistic sentiment or duty to the public good.
Instead they might begin to shirk or simply not be as motivated as before
to give the organization their best efforts as they, under the pressure of
incentive programs, begin to define themselves more as self-interested
seekers of financial incentive bonuses. 133 Thus, these scholars argue, the
introduction of performance-based incentives might actually decrease the
overall effectiveness of bureaucrats or at least distastefully create a
perverse "system that turns knights into knaves." 134 Furthermore, even if
the introduction of incentive programs does not decrease public servants'
overall effectiveness, it may cost society financially because before the
incentive program the public officials were motivated by a factor that cost
society nothing: altruistic feelings. 135 Finally, incentive programs might
actually decrease the interest that altruistic individuals have in working in
the public sector and thus change the profile of public officials. As
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Julian Le Grand, Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy,
26 J. Soc. PoL'Y 149,162 (1997).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 162-63.
135. This does not have to occur if, for example, an organization switches from equal pay
for all similarly situated workers (all doctors, for example) to a performance-based pay system
in which the total budget for salaries does not change.
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expected, the prescription by scholars is to rely on low-powered incentives
or no performance-related incentives at all if bureaucrats are motivated, at
least to some extent, by altruistic motivations.
However, the concern that high-powered financial incentives would
transform LDC politicians and bureaucrats from knights into knaves does
not hold up against the reality that a major reason LDCs are poor is
because a shockingly high number of LDC politicians and bureaucrats are
already much more knave-like than knight-like. 136 The point of the
performance-based incentive program articulated in this Article is to
induce these corrupt agents into acting like knights with the hope that over
decades of developing knight-like habits (or at least not being corrupt) they
might ultimately internalize the mentality of knights (or the mentality of
clean government) or, as a pragmatist might have it, effectively be knights,
that is, true public servants upholding good government.

III.

POSSIBLE DANGERS AND SOURCES OF OPPOSITION

Upon initial reflection, there appear to be numerous potential dangers
associated with, and multiple possible sources of opposition to,
performance-based incentive programs for LDC politicians and
bureaucrats. I address these dangers and sources of opposition below and
explain why they are either not hazardous at all or substantially less of a
concern than one would assume. In any case, none of the worries below
either individually or collectively is large enough to raise serious concerns
about establishing performance-based incentive programs for developing
37
countries.
A. Appearance of "Buying" Public Officials
Any organization or developed country that might contemplate
establishing incentive programs for different LDCs needs to be aware of
how LDC public officials and citizens might view such a program. 138 This
concern about perceptions takes two forms: one legal and one nonlegal.
First, there might be legal obstacles within LDCs that prevent the LDC
public officials from legally accepting a financial payout from foreigners
for any reason. Second, even if legal rules or principles allow foreigners to
136. The same reasoning applies to not worrying significantly about decreasing the
interest that altruistic officials have in being employed in the public sector within many LDCs
and thus having new public jobs filled by non-altruistic hires if performance-based incentive
programs are established for LDC public officials.
137. One potential concern that is not included below (because it was shown in Part II.B.3
not to be a serious impediment to creating incentive programs) is the possibility that
developing country public officials could effectively manipulate performance measurements
to their advantage.
138. It is also important, but substantially less so, what citizens in developed countries
would think of proposed performance-based incentive programs for LDCs. This issue is
addressed below in Section C.

2009]

Buying Our Way Out of Corruption

give financial payments to public officials within an LDC, the perception of
accepting and being motivated by such payments could be harmful to the
LDC public officials. If LDC politicians think, rightly or wrongly, that
citizens of their country perceive the incentive program as a rogue tool
meant to line the pockets of politicians in order to manipulate their
government for the benefit of foreigners, then the LDC politicians would
be more reluctant to consider the benefits of such an incentive scheme.
There are measures that an organization or developed country
interested in establishing performance-based incentive programs for LDCs
could take to reduce the likelihood that LDC citizens would think that the
creator of the incentive programs was attempting to "buy" the LDC public
servants. Given that there is little suspicion that current foreign aid and
loan programs are attempts by the developed world to buy LDC public
officials, it should not be difficult to convince any initially skeptical public
officials or citizens that incentive programs are genuine attempts to pull
LDCs out of the grip of corruption. Unlike current assistance programs,
the performance-based incentive programs would distribute funds only
when LDC politicians and bureaucrats collectively significantly reduce
corruption. If anything, incentive programs should be viewed less
skeptically than the developed countries' current practice of giving billions
of dollars to LDCs despite the likelihood that a significant portion of the
funds will be stolen. Many LDC citizens know that current foreign aid,
despite the best intentions, is compromised because LDC leaders will take
a percentage for themselves and their cronies. LDC citizens may also
realize that developed country leaders and citizens are aware of this and
yet still continue to give aid without the imposition of stringent
139
requirements that must be met by LDC leaders before its distribution.
Performance-based incentive programs are designed to reduce the very
activity that stands in the way of getting aid to those in need.
Additionally, it could be pointed out that because foreign aid is
fungible, developed countries currently giving targeted assistance to LDCs
are already in a real sense partially paying the salaries of public officials on
any number of other local projects. 140 Thus, even if LDC public officials do
not illicitly siphon off significant portions of ODA for themselves, they can
still act in a manner that effectively redirects some ODA to government
programs that the donors do not intend to support. For example, it is
estimated that "around 40 percent of Africa's military spending is
inadvertently financed by aid." 141 To illustrate how the redirection of ODA
139. For a glimpse of the controversy of how the World Bank was attempting to change
this in regard to its own financing, see Steven R. Weisman, Wolfowitz Corruption Drive Rattles
World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at C1.
140. See JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 210

(1966). Bhagwati recounts: "The Austrian government was planning to build a power plant
from its own funds and wished to use Marshall Plan funds to rebuild the [Vienna] Opera
House. When the American authorities failed to see that the Opera House was essential and
withheld funds for this purpose, the Austrian government merely switched their financing
plans: they reconstructed the Opera House from their own funds (previously earmarked for
the power plant) and successfully secured Marshall Plan aid for the power plant!" Id.
141. COLLIER, supra note 4, at 103.

YALE HUMAN RIGHTS

& DEVELOPMENT L.J.

[Vol. 12

occurs, assume that France gives $200 million in ODA to Mali specifically
to build schools, and that Mali already has part of its government budget
allocated to the same task. Mali can then choose to take some of the money
in its budget allocated to building schools and shift it to other government
spending. For example, a portion of the Mali budget that was previously
allocated to building schools can be shifted to meet the salaries of public
officials. If this occurred, France would in effect be contributing to the
payment of those salaries. Considered in this light, financial incentive
programs for LDC public officials do not represent a radical departure
from the targeted foreign assistance programs already in place.
If the same incentive program is offered to public officials in many
LDCs simultaneously, it would strengthen the perception that the incentive
programs are genuinely aimed at helping LDCs break the grip of harmful
corruption. Ideally, the group of eligible LDCs would represent varied
political systems, geographic regions, cultures, religions, ethnicities, and
income levels to help dispel possible views that incentive program
founders were attempting to illicitly or unduly influence a particular group
of LDCs.
The identity of the organization interested in establishing incentive
programs for LDCs is also important in enhancing the credibility of the
programs. As mentioned earlier, if individuals desire to fund an incentive
program, it would be appropriate for them to allow others - e.g., a group
of NGOs or developed countries or the United Nations - to design and
administer the program. Coalitions of program founders and/or program
designers could be deemed more legitimate than individual organizations
or countries establishing an incentive program on their own. A coalition
conveys to participants that numerous countries and organizations believe
in the efficacy of the programs. The same is true for coalitions of private
foundations or NGOs. Governments could consider partnering with
private organizations and vice versa. Also, all potential donors, not just
individuals, could donate adequate funds to the United Nations or another
intergovernmental organization, allowing those organizations to establish
and operate the incentive programs.
Finally, if legal obstacles exist within LDCs that prevent politicians and
bureaucrats from accepting financial payouts from foreigners (or from
anyone for that matter), a referendum should be conducted to decide
whether an exception should be made for bonus payouts from
performance-based financial incentive programs that aim to reduce
corruption within the respective countries. If a referendum is not a viable
option, then the legislature of the LDC should seriously consider creating
an exception in the law solely for a detailed performance-based incentive
program.
It is unknown how many LDCs would decline to take part in foreignfinanced performance-based incentive programs.
Performance-based
financial incentive programs established by a coalition of DC governments,
intergovernmental organizations, private foundations, or NGOs would
very likely be perceived to be legitimate by the letter of the law and public
opinion in many if not most LDCs. However, even if only a small
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percentage of LDCs initially allow incentive programs to be established for
their public officials, any ultimate success that this group of LDCs
experiences in reducing corruption could be a significant factor in later
convincing other LDCs to allow similar programs to be established for their
public officials.
B. Intensifying Illegal Scramble for Political Power
While it is most likely that any intensified competition for political
power brought about by the introduction of an incentive program would
drive current politicians to clean up their act and might also lead to more
capable and honest individuals deciding to enter politics, it is possible that
no such beneficial effects would come to pass. Instead, the incentives
might attract those who would try to manipulate the political process in
their favor. This slim potentiality is effectively mediated by the fact that
noncorrupt public officials could monitor and prosecute individuals
responsible for irregularities at any point in the election cycle. Public
officials generally, and specifically those in charge of monitoring elections,
who are eligible for performance-based bonuses would have the incentive
to effectively monitor elections and pressure their subordinates to do the
142
same.
To avoid the risk that political candidates would use intimidation and
violence to attempt to sway elections to make themselves eligible for
incentive bonuses, incentive programs could make future politicians
ineligible for incentive bonuses if they take power through intimidation,
violence, and/or military action. If such a clause is added to incentive
programs, it should only apply to future politicians since there is no benefit
from preventing current politicians who have already illegally seized
power through force from participating in performance-based incentive
programs. In the unfortunate event that a politician takes power through
force after an incentive program is already in place, then there would be no
choice but to follow Kant's advice and patiently wait for the leader to leave
1 43
before resuming the program.
C. Opposition from Developed Countries and Legality Issues
If benchmarks

are

met,

performance-based

financial

incentive

142. If the threat of prosecution is not enough, another potential way to reduce the
likelihood of a harmful battle for political power would be to give the losing political
candidates financial bonuses if they receive at least a certain percentage of votes cast,
assuming that the LDC reduces corruption enough to meet performance benchmarks. The
need for such a policy would vary depending on the structure of the political and electoral
systems.
143. See Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL PEACE,
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107, 136 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983).
Kant poses the question "'May a people rightfully use rebellion to overthrow the oppressive
power of a so-called tyrant (nontitulo, sed exercitio talis)?"' His response is "it remains wrong
in the highest degree for the subjects to pursue their rights in this way .... "
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programs would provide LDC politicians with yearly bonuses that would
dwarf the salaries of many DC politicians. Some of these politicians might
scoff at the idea of being paid less than LDC politicians and hence refuse to
create incentive programs for LDCs, regardless of whether they agree that
existing foreign aid has not been working and that incentive programs for
LDCs could be a solution. 144 If such sentiment begins to brew, it would be
necessary to emphasize to DC politicians that many of their LDC
counterparts are already taking home more money than they are because of
the existing pervasive corruption and that incentive bonuses are needed to
help the poor in LDCs by paying LDC public officials to significantly
reduce corruption.
It is unlikely that the general public within developed countries would
object to their governments' funding incentive programs for LDC public
officials. 145 Public support for foreign aid is high among the twenty-two
developed country members of the OECD Development Assistance
Committee. In a 2002 survey, all twenty-two member countries had a
supermajority of citizens who believed in the principle of helping poor
countries - in fact, the lowest support among the twenty-two countries
came from Austria, where 68.7% of the public was in favor of assistance. 146
To preempt any potential resistance from DC citizens against their
countries' funding incentive programs, DC politicians could make a
responsible effort to convey the need for and worthiness of the incentive
programs in LDCs. This effort could include an informational campaign
highlighting: the dire need of individuals within LDCs, the reasons for the
failure of previous foreign aid efforts, and how incentive programs offer a
promising solution. It would also be important for politicians to publicize
how much their current government provides in ODA - for example, the
147
U.S. government dedicates only 0.88% of its total federal budget to ODA,
14
8
not 20% like Americans, on average, believed in a 2001 survey.
If some
Americans are against ODA because they think it constitutes too large a
percentage of the federal budget, their resistance to ODA might turn into
support once they are informed of the actual amount spent on ODA.
Further, it would be critical to stress that LDC public officials would only
144. Of course, if LDC incentive programs are funded by private organizations, the above
issue would effectively be moot.
145. While a large majority of developed country citizens would likely support incentive
programs, such programs may increase DC citizens' awareness of widespread corruption in
LDCs, including theft of ODA, and could consequently increase opposition to noncontingent
ODA. This would be a welcome development that is supported by many scholars and, as
previously mentioned, is the approach of the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation.
146. Jude Fransman & Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, Mobilising Public Opinion Against
Global Poverty, OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE POLICY INSIGHTS 1, 3 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/41/31484642.pdf.
147. "In 2006, net ODA by the United States was USD 22.7 billion," while the United
States' ODA/GNI ratio was .17%. OECD, supra note 64. The U.S. federal budget for 2006 was
$2.568 trillion. U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, FY 06 Budget Priorities, tbl. S-1 (Budget
Totals), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ budget/ fy2006/ tables.html.
148. PROGRAM ON INT'L POLICY ATTITUDES, UNIV. OF MD., AMERICANS ON FOREIGN AID
WORLD HUNGER: A STUDY OF U.S. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 6 (2001), available at

AND

http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ pdf/ febO1/ ForeignAid-Feb0l-rpt.pdf.
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receive the incentive bonuses if significant progress in reducing corruption
occurs. Finally, if incentive programs successfully induce some LDCs to
improve, it would be likely that some initially skeptical DC citizens would
come around to the idea of supporting incentive programs that target
corruption.
If one developed country or a group of DCs establishes a performancebased financial incentive program, one would not expect the program to
face challenges of legality, either domestically or internationally. As was
mentioned earlier, foreign aid is considered acceptable, even if it can
encourage corruption. To a certain extent, ODA is already given to
influence the behavior of LDCs; this would also be true of incentive
programs targeting corruption, yet the influence would not be masked, but
explicit.
It would also likely be legal for individuals, NGOs, or private
foundations within developed countries to create an incentive program for
LDC public officials to reduce corruption. Nevertheless, to maintain the
appearance of propriety, any individual interested in funding an incentive
program would be wise to donate the money to establish the program to a
coalition of NGOs, private foundations, developed countries, and/or
international organizations. It would also be prudent for any NGO or
private foundation desiring to launch an incentive program to join other
NGOs, private foundations, developed countries, and/or international
organizations in the endeavor. The most appropriate comparison to
incentive bonuses for the purposes of DC anticorruption laws is the
awarding of well-known honors, like the Nobel Prizes. The altruistic
nature of incentive programs for LDC public officials would shield those
private individuals or organizations from legal challenge.
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions was concluded in 1997.149
The OECD Convention prohibits payments made to foreign public officials
"in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business."15 0 Incentive programs appear not to fall
within the concern of the OECD Convention because they do not attempt
to gain any private business or other improper advantage. 15 1
The United Nations Convention against Corruption uses similar
language to the OECD Convention: "Each State Party shall adopt such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a
criminal offence" the offering "of an undue advantage" to a foreign public
official "in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of
149. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
150. Id.
151. The same can be said of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which was
passed in 1977 to stem gifts to foreign government officials that were meant to gain influence
over such officials. The International Anti-Bribery & Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998), amended the FCPA to comply with the provisions of the
OECD Convention. The illicit influence with which the FCPA concerns itself is virtually the
same as in the OECD Convention.
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his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other
15 2
undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business."'
As with the OECD Convention, incentive bonuses associated with a
performance-based incentive program for LDC public officials do not
appear to fall within the purview of the United Nations Convention
because such bonuses are intended to motivate public servants to perform
their jobs honestly and the incentive program would not seek any
advantages for itself.
D. Precipitating Poorer Governance
Although unlikely, two scenarios could materialize: (1) LDC public
officials eligible for incentive bonuses under an existing incentive program
could purposefully, at first, become more corrupt so that in the future they
could more easily reduce corruption and receive bonus payouts, or (2)
corrupt LDC public officials that do not yet have an incentive program in
place for their country could decide to become more corrupt in hopes of
getting an incentive program in the future.
The situation in the first scenario can be avoided by not adjusting
performance benchmarks downward even if the level of corruption
worsens. Accordingly, public officials would not have an incentive to
initially worsen their behavior because doing so would only make it more
difficult to ultimately meet the benchmarks that would qualify them for the
incentive bonuses.
As for the second scenario, relatively clean LDC governments that
might not qualify for incentive programs would have institutional power
to resist public officials becoming more corrupt. It would be reasonable to
assume that they would resist the temptation of doing harm to their
country for the uncertain chance that they would be considered as
candidates for an incentive program targeting corruption if they became
sufficiently corrupt. If an LDC is very corrupt but not one of the ten LDCs
offered incentive programs initially, as discussed earlier, some public
officials in the LDC might be tempted to draw attention to themselves by
becoming more corrupt, and the LDC would have little institutional
capacity to stop them. It seems unlikely that public officials would employ
such a strategy, however, because there is no guarantee that it would result
in success. Coordinating such a strategy among hundreds of politicians
and thousands of bureaucrats would be difficult. Moreover, even if such
strategists could pull off a dramatic increase in corruption that draws
international attention, there is no guarantee that such attention would
have the desired persuasive effect on the committee in charge of selecting
LDCs for financial incentive programs. Finally, if incentive programs
successfully reduce corruption in the first batch of ten developing countries
in which they are offered, it would appear likely that new incentive
152. United Nations Convention against Corruption art. 16, opened for signature Dec. 9,
2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
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programs would be created for other LDCs. Yet, if the first generation of
incentive programs proves unsuccessful and no or few bonuses are paid
out, then there would be a lack of enthusiasm for establishing new
incentive programs - giving corrupt public officials in an LDC not already
covered by an incentive program no motivation to become more corrupt in
the hopes that an incentive program would be established for them.
E. Solidifying Politicians' Expectations of Money
At the end of a successful incentive program, after thirty years of LDC
public officials receiving large financial bonuses, those officials might
demand continued bonuses of roughly comparable sizes or consider
drifting back to the bad old days of endemic corruption. While public
officials might expect good salaries after the conclusion of an incentive
program, the risk that they would actually resort to corruption rather than,
for example, demand higher salaries is likely minimal. Furthermore, the
discussion should be placed in the proper context. LDC citizens should
prefer a well-functioning, clean government whose public officials expect
to be well compensated for good performance over a poorly functioning,
corrupt government whose public officials simply steal whatever they can
get away with. While public officials' salaries would probably not be
nearly as high as incentive bonuses after the conclusion of a successful
incentive program, it would be very likely that official salaries would be
significantly higher than at the start of an incentive program. This is partly
because citizens would likely be willing to support wages that sustain the
clean governance, and partly because, after thirty years of cleaner
government and the benefits that go along with it, one would expect the
LDC to have the resources that would allow it to pay higher public sector
salaries.
What is of utmost importance is to establish clean governance
conducive to sustained economic growth; that makes all other challenges of
development, e.g. in health care and education, more manageable. If this
can most effectively be accomplished by offering politicians and high-level
bureaucrats incentive bonuses, then discomfort with the fact that the
bonuses might enrich those who receive them should not be allowed to
overshadow the real societal benefits engendered by the program.

CONCLUSION

Since those who are corrupt are often those who are in positions of
political power, it has been a monumental challenge to successfully
encourage these individuals to reform their behavior. Performance-based
financial incentive programs for poor and low middle-income countries
can establish an environment of clean governance favorable to long-term
economic, social, and political development. Paying abusers to stop
abusing may seem distasteful, but there is probably no faster way to
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improve the lives of millions than to do just that.
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